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Warth Redux:
The Making of Warth v. Seldin
BRIAN

G. GILMORE*

Etymology
Article III
Section I

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated

Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.'
Section 2
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and

Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,

under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the
*Supervising Attorney and Clinical Adjunct Professor in the Howard University School of
Law's Fair Housing Clinic. I would like to thank Heather Dillingham, Howard University School
of Law Class of 2008, for assisting with researching parts of this article. In addition, I would like
to thank Dean Kurt Schmoke, Associate Dean Okainer Christian Dark, Director of the Clinical
Law Center, Professor Tamar Meekins, Interim Director of the Clinical Law Center (Fall 2008),
Professor Josephine Ross, Edward Davis, Program Manager of the Fair Housing Clinic, Howard
University School of Law. and John N. Jacob, of the Washington and Lee University Law School
for his assistance in securing access to the Powell papers.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.
[147]
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United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two
or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;
between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects. 2
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed
limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the
general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's
legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized
grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.3
"When a court determines a person's standing to sue, it is
deciding whether a specific person4 is the proper party to bring a
matter to the court for adjudication."
The 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing, the
court instructed, has been defined as containing three
elements: (1) that the plaintiff has suffered an "injury-infact," that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is
concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there is a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of; and (3) that it must be likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.5

Prelude
Robert Katz, Associate Professor of Law at the District of
Columbia School of Law, 6 is frustrated. It is the Spring semester,
2. U.S. CONST. art. III § 2.
3. John T. Hansen, Pushing the Envelope of Creditor's Committee Power, 80 AM. BANKER.

L.J. 89, 93 (2006).
4. Kathryn Lee Dietrich, Saving the States from Unsuitable Plaintiffs: The Lack of Standing
in Business Income Tax CreditsForBusiness Development, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 343, 346 (2006).
5. George L.Blum, Annotation, Standing of Employee or Former Employee to Bring Civil
Action Under ERISA, 21 A.L.R. FED. 2d 199 § 17 (2007).
6. Formerly Antioch School of Law, the D.C. School of Law was established in 1989. It is
now the David A. Clarke School of Law and is one of the nation's few public interest clinical law
schools.
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1992, Katz's Federal Jurisdiction class is discussing standing under
Article III to the U.S. Constitution. One case in particular is causing
Professor Katz considerable anguish: Warth v. Seldin. It is a
moment difficult to forget. Professor Katz's lecture contains a few
expletives and an abiding tone of personal angst.
Years before Professor Katz's lecture, residents of the area
around Rochester, New York, non-profit housing developers, eligible
taxpayers, low-income Afircan Americans and Puerto Ricans, and
other eligible persons, sought to integrate a suburban Rochester, New
York, town called Penfield.8 Penfield, the city, was 98 percent white
at the time of the lawsuit.9 Zoning laws and ordinances passed by the
city in 1962 kept the city segregated and nearly all white since its
inception with little, if any chance for change. 10
A lawsuit was filed in federal court against the city of Penfield
alleging racial discrimination as a result of the exclusionary zoning
ordinances that effectively kept African Americans, Puerto Ricans,
and the poor out of the city of Penfield.I 1 Housing developers were
part of the lawsuit because the ordinance prevented the developers
from constructing housing in Penfield that12 would provide housing to
individuals with low to moderate income.
The United States District Court for the Western District of New
York dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing. 3 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
case. 14 The U.S. Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction of the case and
5 The author of the majority opinion: the
upheld both decisions.'
"quiet centrist,"' 6 Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.17
Warth is one of Justice Powell's forgotten moments on the court.
Yet, the opinion is troubling now even thirty-four years after it was
7. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
8. Id. at 493. The town of Penfield, New York is located in Monroe County, New York. It
was founded by Daniel Penfield, a veteran of the Revolutionary War, and merchant. The town
Strong"
See Bicentennial Celebration: "Generations
was incorporated in 1810.
http://www.penfield.org/index.php?pr- BicentennialCelebration (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

9. Id.
10. Warth, 422 U.S. at 495.
11. Id. at 493-94.
12. Id. at 497.
13. Id. at 493.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Linda Greenhouse, Lewis F. Powell Jr., Who Became the Quiet Centrist of the Supreme
Court, Is Dead at 90; N.Y. TIMES, August 26, 1998, at 1.
17. Lewis F. Powell served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1971-1987. See Timeline of the
Justices: Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,: 1972-1987, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/history/
supremecourthistory.history-assoc_084powell.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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rendered. The Court, through Powell's opinion, uses the law to avoid
addressing a difficult issue put forth by Warth: residential segregation
based upon race and class and perpetuated by zoning ordinances and
policy. This essay revisits Warth with a fresh perspective and the
passage of time from 1975 when the Supreme Court originally
rendered the decision.
With the assistance of Justice Powell's Supreme Court papers
from the Warth deliberations, this essay explores the following: Did
Lewis Powell, despite his reputation as the "quiet centrist," but a
child of racially segregated and more privileged Virginia, issue a
decision that potentially impacted housing patterns in America based
upon his own lingering personal prejudices relating to race and class
nurtured during the post-Plessy18 days of Richmond, Virginia?
Part I of this essay explores the life of Lewis Powell from his
days in Richmond up through his appointment to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Part II discusses Article III standing in the leading U.S.
Supreme Court cases that form the foundation of the legal arguments
set forth in the Warth case. Part III examines the Warth decision
from the standpoint of Powell's papers on the opinion and the behind
the scenes deliberations of the case's issues. Part IV discusses the
Powell opinion and the counter-arguments to Powell's opinions as
presented by the plaintiffs in the case. Part V presents the dissenting
voices in the decision including the dissents of other justices and
legal scholars and journalists who noted the decision after it was
rendered. Finally, Part VI offers closing remarks on the case and the
historical relevance of the decision.
As is necessary, this article begins with the examination of the
life and work of the Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

I. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
A. Powell's Upbringing
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. was born on September 19, 1907, in
19
Suffolk, Virginia. 19 His father,
Louis F. Powell, Sr., 20 moved
the
family to the city of Richmond, Virginia the following year. 2 1 It was
here that Lewis would grow up. Powell, Sr., after a series of
employment and business misadventures, consistently earned a good
18. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19. JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL JR. 16 (Charles Scribner's Sons 1994)

(2001).
20. Id. Justice Powell's father spelled his name "Louis" according to his biography.
21. Id.
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living for his family as a manager and owner of David M. Lea and
Company, a "small and rather antiquated manufacturer of tobacco
boxes, cigar boxes, and shopping cases" inRichmond.22 Years later,
the business would be sold by Powell, Sr. providing the entire family
with a significant financial windfall.23
Richmond, the city where Lewis Powell, Jr. grew up, was an
important city for Powell. It was in Richmond that Powell's views
about the world likely were framed. In 1902, just five years before
Lewis Powell was born, the state of Virginia in keeping in line with
its history and the philosophical and legal direction of the country's
southern states, passed a new constitution. 24 The constitution was
specifically designed to disenfranchise the African-American
25
In fact, a Constitutional Convention was
population of Virginia.
called in February 1901 and the following year, the convention was
held.26 On July 10, 1902, the new constitution was passed by an
overwhelming margin effectively putting in place a racial apartheid
system in Virginia and in Richmond.27
Needless to say, well before the passage of the 1902 constitution,
"official segregation in Richmond" was already the city's unspoken
law and custom. 28 By the 1880s, in fact, African American and white
children were not only attending separate schools but were also
"walking to and from school on separate sides of the streets. 29
Following the end of the Civil War, slavery, and the passage of laws
enfranchising African Americans, the whites of Richmond resisted
change and fought long and hard to deny African Americans the right
to vote. 30 African Americans did vote in Richmond for a short period
of time until white leaders began gerrymandering the districts in an
effort to deny the right by32dividing them. 31 But the 33constitution of
1902 addressed the voting and all other racial issues.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Joshua Rothman, The Politics of Disenfranchisement, White Supremacy and AfricanAmerican Resistance in Charlottesville, 1900-1925: Virginia Constitutional Convention (2002),
Virginia Center for Digital History, available at http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/afam/
politics/convention.html.

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Richard R.W. Brooks, IncorporatingRace, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2048 (2006).
29. Id.
30. Edward Chappel, Valentine Museum's Jim Crow (Jim Crow Racism and Reaction in the
New South, Richmond 1865-1940; Valentine Museum, Richmond, Virginia), THE NATION, July
17, 1989.
31. Id.
32. Id. Through the use of poll taxes, literacy tests, and Confederate credentials, African
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There is no evidence that Powell was a devout segregationist;
however, Powell, like many whites born into and of privilege in
Richmond in the midst of the Jim Crow era, accepted the life and the
societal arrangements regarding race they inherited without overt and
open argument or dissent. There is no indication in the Jeffries
biography that he did not reject the life he had inherited either in any
form of passive or aggressive protest.
This period in Powell's life cannot be ignored. The gravity of
life in Richmond for African Americans during this time shares a
historical relationship with the issues at stake in Warth:
During the late nineteenth century, Richmond's AfricanAmericans were increasingly precluded from participating in
white-dominated society. Opportunities for AfricanAmericans to participate in Richmond's economy had always
been highly circumscribed, but the rise of Jim Crow and legal
disenfranchisement restricted
the opportunities of African34
Americans even more.
African Americans, in Richmond, at the time of Powell's birth
and early life in the city were "shunted aside by law and custom" and
were "forced to live a separate existence." 35 The city, in all respects
had two sides: "one white, the other black. 36 Thus, the question is
not what kind of life Powell led but rather whether his segregated
upbringing had any effect on his judicial philosophy.
Nevertheless, Powell overall enjoyed a very successful academic
life and career and his accomplishments certainly reveal his talents.
After graduating first in his Harvard Law School class in 1931,
Powell studied there for an additional year. 37 Powell initially worked
for the firm of Christian, Barton, and Parker during the Great
Depression. 38 He later joined the Richmond law firm of Hunton,
Williams, Anderson, Gay & Moore on January 1, 1935, as an
associate.39 Three years later on January 1, 1938, he made partner at
Americans effectively lost their voting rights. In fact, before the constitution was passed, over
6,000 African Americans in Richmond voted. Following the passage of the new constitution, only
760 retained the right to vote.
33. Id.
34. STEVEN J. HOFFMAN, RACE, CLASS AND POWER INTHE BUILDING OF RICHMOND, 18701920 144 (McFarland & Co. Inc., Publishers 2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 34.
38. Id. at 46.
39. Id. at 46.
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40

the firm.
Powell also served admirably in World War II volunteering
almost immediately after the U.S. became involved in the war after
Pearl Harbor.4 ' Powell excelled in the military and rose in the ranks
"from first lieutenant to colonel,
the
of Merit, Bronze
,, earning
•
• Legion
42
Star and Croix de Guerre" during his service. Powell also served in
the "Special Branch," an army division that assisted in decoding
"German messages" that were used by the allies to pick bombing
targets.43 After the war, he returned to the States to work at the
Hunton firm where he was still a partner and where he eventually
took on a larger leadership role and helped expand the firm's reach
and client base. 44
Powell's other career highlights before he arrived at the Supreme
Court included, a term as President of the American Bar Association
in 1964-1965 and a long tenure on the Virginia State Board of
Education.45 Powell's term as ABA President included strong
advocacy for more legal assistance to the poor by the federal
government. 46 This last point is difficult to juxtapose with the
decision in Warth considering some of the plaintiffs this essay will
discuss later. Powell also served as Chairman of the Richmond
School Board from 1952-1961. 47
Powell's tenure on the Richmond School Board is significant
because Powell's tenure occurred during the time of the Brown v.
Boardof Education48 decision and when many Jim Crow laws around
the country were successfully outlawed. Powell was not in charge of
the specific schools that resisted change but he was in charge of the
school board.
Examined more closely, the fact that Powell chaired the school
board of Richmond, Virginia, at such a contentious time suggests that
Powell was in position to bring about significant change in the

40. Id. at 53.
41. Pearl Harbor, the location of the United States' naval fleet in the Pacific, was attacked by
Japan on December 7, 1941, at 7:55 a.m. The bombing of the naval base is the event which led the
U.S. to enter World War II. Robert Sullivan, PearlHarbor: What Really Happened? Time, May
25, 2001, availableat http://www.time.com/time/sampler/article/ 0,8599,128065,00.html.
42. Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial CentristJustice Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 1998.
43. JEFFERLES, supra note 19, at 88-91.
44. Id. at 129-30.
45. Id. at 123.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 124.
48. Id. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., rendered in 1954, affectively outlawed legal segregation on
the basis of race. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Richmond school system. Yet, during Powell's tenure, there was
little, if any change in the racial composition of the segregated
Richmond school system.49 There were also many more disturbing
facts regarding Powell's tenure on the board.
First, it wasn't until 1960 that African-American children were
admitted to white schools in Richmond.5 ° In fact, of the 23,000
African-American students in Richmond, only two attended school
with whites when Powell resigned in 1961.51 Powell has been
defended over the years on this point because the school board did
not control the assignment of students. 52 But Powell biographer,
John C. Jeffries even found it difficult to accept the argument.
Jeffries stressed that while it was "true" that the only the state
could "assign black students to white schools," the local school
boards such as the Richmond board Powell chaired had a role in
"maintaining segregation." 53 Jeffries added the following:
Obviously, the state board did not consider individually the
appropriate school for every child in Virginia. Special
requests came to the Pupil Placement Board, but the patterns
of pupil assignment were set by local practice. In Richmond,
the directory of public schools explicitly grouped 'White
Schools' in one division and 'Negro Schools' in another.
There was one set of geographic attendance zones for the
white schools and another set of attendance zones for the
black schools.54
Jeffries stresses that in 1954, the year of the Brown decision; this
is the system that existed.55 When Powell departed from the school
board in 1961, the system was still in place. 56 For a man of Powell's
reputation, this was clear evidence that he supported and never
attempted in any way to dismantle the Jim Crow school system that
existed in Virginia when he was born. Further evidence discussed by
Jeffries reveals also that even when it was appropriate for the local
school board to transfer African-American students to white schools
as a result of overcrowding in the African-American schools, the
49. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 139-42.

50. Id. at 140.
51. Id. at 140-41.
52. Id. at 141-142.

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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57
board, under Powell's leadership took no such action.
In conclusion, Powell's service as chairman of the Richmond
School Board is troubling in light of the Warth decision. It suggests
that even when the law of the country advances forward, Powell
allowed the social practices he was exposed to daily in his formative
years to influence his public service decisions. If Powell would
refuse to allow integration of schools for nearly a decade as chairman
of a school board, is it inconceivable to suggest that as a Supreme
Court justice, Powell refused to allow judicial intervention to address
an obvious problem with racial segregation?

B. Powell's Supreme Court Appointment
Powell was one of four Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court
appointed during the Nixon administration.58
The Nixon's
appointments transformed the Court instantaneously. Powell's term
on the Supreme Court is one of the most important and famous of the
modem era.
Due to these appointments, the legendary "Warren Court," 59 led
by Chief Justice Earl Warren, became the "Burger Court," led by the
Minnesota conservative Warren Burger.60 Yet this change also set
the stage for Powell's historical role on the Court as a swing vote in
many opinions where the liberal wing of the Court led by Justice
William Brennan 6 1 and the conservative wing led by Chief Justice
Warren Burger were evenly split.
When Powell was nominated to the Court, opposition was strong

57. Id.
58. President Nixon appointed Warren Burger, Harry Blackmun, William Rehnquist and

Lewis F. Powell Jr. to the high court during his time in office. See The Supreme Court and Public
Policy: The Supreme Court of the 1970s, American Decades, http://www.encyclopedia.com/
doc/1G2-3468302734.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

59. The Warren Court, notably, was responsible for not only the Brown v. Board of
Education decisions that ended school desegregation based on race, but the Court also handed
down several decisions that expanded and clarified the Bill of Rights. See The Warren Court,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02-history/subs-history/02-c14. html (last visited Feb. 17,
2009). It is referred to as "The Warren Court" as its Chief Justice was Earl Warren, former
Governor of California, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from 1953-1969. See The History
of the Court, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/o2_history/subs.timeline/images_chiefs/
014.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

60. Warren Earl Burger served as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1969 to
1986. See The History of the Court, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/o2_history
/substimeline/irnages_chiefs/015.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

61. William J. Brennan served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1956 to 1990. See The
History of the Court, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/o2_history/subs timeline/images.
associates/076.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

from a few individuals of great influence at the time. This is
noteworthy in regards to the final outcome in Warth decision because
the fiercest opposition to the nomination of Powell emanated from
two African Americans, U.S. Representative John Conyers of
Michigan, 62 and Attorney, Henry Marsh III of Virginia, 63 who was
also the first African-American mayor of the city of Richmond.
Conyers presented the most strident opposition and provided the
Senate Judiciary Committee with extensive testimony as to why
Powell should not be confirmed to the Court. 64 The Conyers-Marsh
opposition is significant precisely because of the social issue at stake
in Warth: segregation.
Conyers' comments concerned Powell's tenure as chairman of
the Richmond School Board and how the city of Richmond, on
Powell's watch, had been able to maintain a dual system of public
education: one for African Americans, another for whites. 65 Conyers
referenced the 1963 Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Bradley v.
School Board of City of Richmond, Virginia66 that, in the view of that
court, and Conyers, served as proof that following the Brown
decision, Richmond continued to operate as if Brown had never been
decided.
What the very words of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth
Circuit, indicate beyond any doubt is that Mr. Powell's 8year reign as chairman of the Richmond School Board
created and maintained a patently segregated system,
characterized by grossly overcrowded black public schools,
white schools not filled to normal capacity, and the school
62. United States Representative John Conyers, Jr., a Detroit Democrat, was re-elected in
November 2006 to his twenty-second term in the U.S. House of Representatives, winning 87
percent of the vote in Michigan's Fourteenth Congressional District. Congressman Conyers
represents all of Highland Park and Hamtramck, as well as large portions of Detroit and Dearborn.
In addition, due to recent Congressional redistricting, the Down River communities of Melvindale,
Allen Park, Southgate, Riverview, Trenton, Gibraltar, and Grosse Ile Township are also part of the
14th District. Congressman Conyers, a senior statesman in American political life, is respected
and admired by colleagues on both sides of the aisle. Reserved and studious, he has quietly built a
solid record of legislative achievement in his 43 years on Capitol Hill. See Meet John Conyers,
http://www.johnconyers.com/biography (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
63. Henry Marsh currently serves in the Virginia Senate. He was born in 1933 in Richmond,
Va. A long-time civil rights lawyer, Marsh became mayor of Richmond in 1977, the first African

American

to

hold

the

position.

See

Henry

March,

http://www.virginia.edu/

publichistory/biographies/hm.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
64. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the
Com. on the Judiciary92nd Con. 349-97 (1971).
65. Id. at 363-86.
66. 317 F.2d 429 (1963).
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board's effective perpetuation of a discriminatory feeder or
assignment system whereby black children were hopelessly
trapped in inadequate, segregated schools.67
Conyers added that at the end of Powell's tenure as Chairman on
the Richmond School Board, "only 37 black children out of a total of
68
more than 23,000 were attending previously white schools."
Conyers stressed that Powell did not respect the decrees of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the area of school desegregation, 69and Powell
sanctioned the dual system of racially segregated schools.
The Conyers-Marsh opposition to Powell was not enough alone
to stop the nomination. Powell had the support of Oliver Hill, 70 a
Richmond attorney, and member of the Brown v. Bd. of Educ.7 1 legal
team, to counter the attack by Conyers. Powell also enjoyed
tremendous support from an array of respected individuals. The
Senate Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to confirm Powell. 2
The full Senate vote was nearly the same with just Senator Fred
Harris of Oklahoma voting against Powell.73 Interestingly, in voting
against Powell, Harris referred to Powell as
74 an "elitist" who had
never shown "deep feelings for little people."
C. Powell on the Supreme Court
After becoming a member of the Court, Lewis Powell,
irrespective of his views, became a strong Justice on the Court.
Powell made his presence known immediately and again
demonstrated, as he had in law school, in professional practice, and in
the military that he was a quick learner and an able and adept
intellectual. Powell did not shy away from race cases or cases
involving inequality as well.
As a man born and bred in the capitol of the Confederacy,
67. Nominations of Rehnquist and Powell, supra note 65, at 363.
68. Id. at 371.
69. Id.
70. Oliver Hill was born May 1, 1907. A long-time civil rights attorney and Virginia native,
Hill was one of the key attorneys who successfully litigated the Brown decisions of 1954. The
Associated Press, Oliver Hill, Civil Rights Attorney, is Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/washington/06hill.html.
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown, arguably the most important Supreme Court decision of
the 20th century, declared "separate but equal" schools unconstitutional and ultimately began the
process that dismantled the system of legalized segregation in the U.S.
72. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 240.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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Powell was fully aware that race, as an issue, was divisive. However,
Powell also possessed core values that were shaped slowly over the
years which he would not forfeit just because he had entered perhaps
the most challenging arena in the American legal system. Powell
asserted his beliefs in his votes on the Court and demonstrated early
on that he was, at least ideologically, opposed to racial segregation.
However, Powell did not always agree with his colleagues, neither
with respect to the remedies necessary to address racial segregation
nor what alleged perpetrators of that segregation were required to
adhere to under the law.
In his first half-term on the court, Powell authored a
concurring/dissenting opinion in the Denver, Colorado, school
desegregation case, Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1.75 The majority
opinion, written by the great liberal William Brennan, and only
joined in part by Powell (for altogether different reasons), sought to
treat a non-southern public school system (Denver) different from the
southern public school districts that had been ordered over the years
by the Court to desegregate due to the Brown76 decisions.77 In effect,
Powell believed that it was a mistake to treat de facto78 segregation
different from dejure79 segregation.
Keyes is an important post-Brown case and very important for
the analysis of Warth. It provides an early indication that Justice
Powell possessed a different legal and social perspective in race
cases. Although Keyes is a school case and Warth is a residential
case, both are segregation cases based upon race.
Keyes, as policy, is an example of the federal government
aggressively addressing racial segregation in a citywide school
system (Denver) even though the evidence that there was widespread
racial discrimination in the school system was not clearly evident
throughout the system.80 The syllabus of the case's opinion was clear
on this issue and this is the part of the opinion that troubled Powell:
Where, as in this case, a policy of intentional segregation has
been proved with respect to a significant portion of the

75. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973).

76. 347 U.S. at 483.
77. See generally Keyes, 413 U.S. 189.
78. Latin for "concerning the fact." It does not involve a particular law meaning, in this
context, it is segregation by custom or practice.
79. Latin for "by law." It does involve a particular law that upholds the practice.
80. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 189. The evidence in Keyes, as presented, demonstrated that unlike
many school desegregation cases, the Denver school system was not operating a dual system of

segregation in schools. The school system, however, was engaged in discrimination. Id. at 190.
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school system, the burden is on the school authorities
(regardless of claims that their 'neighborhood school policy'
was racially neutral) to prove that their actions as to other
segregated schools in the
81 system were not likewise motivated
by a segregative intent.
Keyes took the position that the fact that one part of the city was
segregated by race in the public school system was enough to sustain
the core allegations of the lawsuit.82 There was no evidence that the
Denver school system was operating dual systems of public
education based upon race. However, it was apparent that the overall
effect of the conduct of one district had impact upon the entire school
system.
Powell did not accept the argument.
"In my view," Powell wrote in Keyes, "we should abandon a
distinction which long since has outlived its time, and formulate
constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional
application., 83 Powell further noted that "the great contribution of
Brown I was its holding in unmistakable terms that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids state-compelled or state-authorized segregation
of public schools. 84
Powell believed that the Brown decision and the line of cases
that followed Brown placed a duty on the school districts to eliminate
segregation no matter what section of the country that the district was
located. Keyes was seemingly harmless at the time. Powell's dissent
was just that - a dissent. However, Powell's disagreement in Keyes
was a clear hint as to his future votes in school integration cases.
Powell was opposed to segregation but was also opposed to the
specific intervention efforts by the judiciary to facilitate the end of
segregation.
This became more evident when Powell voted with the
conservative wing of the Court in Wright v. City Council of
Emporia.85 Powell did not author
a dissent in Wright but he did join
86
Chief Justice Burger's dissent.
In Wright, the city of Emporia, Virginia, sought to separate from
Greenville County, Virginia, with respect to its public school

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 190.
Id.
Id. at 219.
Id.
407 U.S. 451 (1972).
Id. at 471.
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system. 87 Due to the fact that the separation, in the view of the
majority, would "impede the process of dismantling" 88 a county
school system that was historically segregated, Emporia could not
separate from the county system. Emporia, in the view of the
majority, had once been part of the very system that was in need of
being dismantled.
Powell's vote, in this instance, demonstrated the same
philosophy that had been revealed to a degree in Keyes. Where in
Keyes, Powell's motivation was to stand firm against aggressive
intervention by the federal government on grounds that lacked
evidentiary support for such intervention; Wright was a much more
defined stance.
The dissent in Wright stood for the conservative ideal of local
autonomy. The dissenters were prepared to extend a considerable
degree of discretion to local officials as they sought to correct their
school systems following the Court's numerous desegregation
decisions. 89 Emporia, the city, was seeking to create a new city
controlled public school system that did not necessarily suggest any
malevolent purpose. However, the effect of such a new system
would be to impede desegregation within the region (the county) and
to increase the number of black students attending school in the
county system. The Court did not believe such an approach was
tolerable under the school cases that preceded Wright.
The Burger dissent, which Powell joined, rejected the notion that
desegregation should achieve specific "racial balancing." 90 Yet the
evidence suggests that the more important concept to the
conservatives dissenting in Wright was local control. It was a theme
that the Keyes decision also suggested but Wright clearly enunciated
this view. Burger's opinion is emphatic:
Local control is not only vital to continued public support of
the schools, but it is of overriding importance from an
educational standpoint as well. The success of any school
system depends on a vast range of factors that lie beyond the
competence and power of the courts. Curricular decisions,
the structuring of grade levels, the planning of extracurricular
activities, to mention a few, are matters lying solely within
the province of school officials, who maintain a day-to-day

87. Id. at 454.
88. Id. at 466.
89. Id. at 477-78 (Burger, J., dissenting).

90. Id. at 472-74.
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supervision that a judge cannot. A plan devised by school
officials is apt to be attuned to these highly relevant
educational goals; a plan deemed preferable in the abstract by
a judge might well
overlook and thus undermine these
91
primary concerns.
Powell's votes in both Keyes and Wright cases were consistent
with a more conservative view of remedial desegregation efforts.
Both cases involved efforts by the courts to aggressively impose a
remedy upon a school district. Powell rejected this approach. This is
extremely important because the imposition of a remedy to address
entrenched segregation patterns was the solution in the Warth case.
Needless to say, the Keyes and Wright cases are, indeed, a legal
preface to Justice Powell's role in the Warth decision.
D. Certiorari
In the initial certiorari conference 92 held on October 7, 1974, in
Warth, the sitting justices
voted 6-3 in favor99596
of denying review
of the
93
9
Justices Rehnquist,94 Blackmun, ' Stewart,
case by the court.
Powell, Douglas and Chief Justice Warren Burger all voted to deny
review in that initial vote. 9 7 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and White
voted to grant certiorari.98 However, at some point, Justice William
0 Douglas, 99 the great New Deal liberal, switched his vote.' 00
91. Id. at 478.
92. Certiorari is Latin for "to be informed of." Litigants file a petition for writ for certiorari
with the Court, and if granted, the Court will hear the case. The certiorari conference is where the
justices voted as to whether to hear a case. Certiorari is granted if four justices vote to hear the
case. Supreme Cout Procedures: Writs of Certiorari, http://www.uscourts.gov/outreach/topics/
hamdanlprocedures.html#writs (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
93. Lewis F. Powell Jr., Warth v. Seldin Certiorari Conference Documents (Oct. 1, 1974)
(collected papers on file with author).
94. William Rehnquist served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1971-2005. He served as
Chief Justice of the Court from 1985-2005. Charles Lane, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
Dies, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at A-I.
95. Harry Andrew Blackmun served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1970 to 1994.
Timeline of the Justices: Harry A. Blackmun, 1970-1994, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/
02_history/subs timeline/imagesassociates/083.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
96. Potter Stewart served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1958 to 1981. Timeline of the
Justices: Potter Stewart, 1958-1981, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs
timeline/images-associates/078.html.
97. Warth v. Seldin Certiorari Conference Documents, supra note 95.
98. Id.
99. Justice William 0. Douglas served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1937-1975.
Timeline of the Justices: William 0. Douglas, 1939-1975, http://www.supremecourt
history.org/02_history/subs-timeline/images-associates/067.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6

On Powell's conference chart, Douglas' deny vote isscratched
out with the words "Join 3''l01 beside the box. Douglas provided the
crucial fourth vote required to grant review of the case.' 0 2 Justice
Lewis Powell also scribbles the following intriguing notes on his
Warth voting sheet: "Only the standing issue was reached by CA2 but it didn't discuss SCRAP. Stewart commented that SCRAP was
environmental case involving 'air everyone breathes.' He seemed to
think this 0 is
unique standing situation. Brennan argues there is
3
standing."'
Powell also writes in large letters the words "Granted" on the
sheet followed
again by the short phrase: "only issue is
'standing. ' 104 Finally, Powell writes in the box beside his vote: "We
have had enough standing cases recently,"' 0 5 a phrase that seems
almost unnecessary.
But did those final comments by Powell suggest frustration on
his part that the case had, indeed, been granted review by the Court
even though he saw no need to accept a case with difficult legal
issues but more importantly, social issues many members of the
Court would gladly have avoided at the time? Perhaps Powell, a man
with an impeccable reputation in legal circles, felt the burden of the
sensitive issues in the case. Was the man who would become known
as the "quiet centrist" 10 6 feeling the pressure of the moment that
involved a case with glaring controversial issues hidden beneath its
procedural debate?
Warth was, of course, a very important case in 1974-75. The
U.S. was in the early stages of racial integration following the
passage of several civil rights laws' 0 7 and cases such as Warth were
bellwethers on the progression of racial equality. Warth was a
challenge to a zoning ordinance of the Town of Penfield, New York,
that, among other things, zoned "90% of all vacant land for single
family detached housing."' 1 8 In addition, the zoning ordinance fixed
"minimum lot sizes, floor areas, lot widths, and setbacks for
100. Warth v. Seldin Certiorari Conference Documents, supra note 95.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Greenhouse, supra note 16, at 1.
107. In 1964, the Civil Rights Act became law. In 1965, the Voting Rights Act was passed
and signed into law. Finally, in 1968, the Fair Housing Act was passed and signed into law.
Federal Civil Rights Primer, Congressional Research Service, Oct. 24, 2008, available at
https://secure.sunshinepress.org/wiki/CRS.
108. Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187,1189 (2d Cir. 1974).
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dwellings" and limited "density to twelve units per acre, limits the
portion of the lot which may be occupied by the dwelling, and
require[d] a minimum 10number
of garage and unenclosed parking
9
facilities for each unit."'
The ordinance, in effect, did not allow low- to moderate-income
housing to be constructed in the city and thus, either purposely or
incidentally, excluded members of minority groups who lacked the
financial ability to obtain financing to purchase a home in the
community. The city practiced what was described as housing policy
"fairly typical for a suburban community ' ' I10 at the time.
The Plaintiffs in Warth were "various organizations and
individuals.., in the Rochester, New York, metropolitan area."'
This included Metro-Act, 1 2 a "not-for-profit New York corporation,
formed for the purposes of which are 'to alert ordinary citizens to
problems of social concern"';" 3 "Housing Council in the Monroe
County Area (Housing Council), a not-for-profit corporation
consisting of a number of organization interested in housing
problems"; 114 "Rochester Home Builders Association (Home
Builders), embracing a number of residential construction firms in the
Rochester area"; 1 5 several taxpayers living in the Rochester area
such as Robert Warth and Victor Vinkley; and "several Rochester
area residents with low or moderate incomes who are also members
of minority racial or ethnic groups." 116 The case was filed in the
United States District Court for the Western District of New York.117
The District Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for
"lack of standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted."
The appeal of that ruling was taken thereafter to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 119 The
Court of Appeals held that none of the plaintiffs had standing
and
120
affirmed the ruling of the District Court to dismiss the case.
The petition for certiorari soon followed.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
motion to
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id.
422 U.S.
Id. at 493. Metro Act is referred to in the decision as "Metro Act of Rochester Inc."
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. Procedurally, "Home Builders" sought to intervene as a party-plaintiff but the
intervene was denied. Id. at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id.
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Even though it is a case about standing in federal court, Warth is
also a case about race and class. It was a successful action by a
suburban municipality to use exclusionary zoning laws to deny lowto moderate-income minorities from residing permanently in the city.
Exclusionary zoning is a legal tactic used with great success in the
past by municipalities to deny housing to racial minorities.' 2 1 It
harkens back to a disgraceful period in the United States.
In 1917, the U.S. Supreme ruled that exclusionary zoning based
upon race is unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley.122 The issue in
Buchanan was the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance in
Louisville, Kentucky, that made it unlawful for persons of color to
''occupy as a residence ... or to establish and maintain as a place of
public assembly any house upon any block upon which a greater
number of houses are occupied as residences.., by white people
than are occupied as residences, places of abode.., by colored
people."'' 23 In Buchanan, the Court held that the Louisville
ordinance, as it applied to the property rights of persons of color, is
not a "legitimate exercise of police power."' 124 In addition, the Court
held that the ordinance
violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
25
could not stand. 1

Buchanan was an important holding despite the fact that
municipalities in the South, ignored the decision and fought the
decision for decades. By the time of the Warth decision, and the rise
126
of suburban segregation patterns throughout the country,
exclusionary zoning ordinances
had re-emerged though in a less overt
27
manner than in Buchanan.1

The Warth opinion reflects the seemingly benign features of
such ordinances. By dismissing the case completely, the real issue in
the case involving race, class and residential integration was
dismissed as well. The decision also effectively dismissed that issue
with respect to equal housing, which was the reason the lawsuit was
filed.
But in order to understand the Warth opinion and why the
Powell decision is still difficult even after all these years, a discussion
121. STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, As LONG As THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 18-29 (Rowman &

Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2000).
122. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
123. Id. at 72.
124. Id. at 82.
125. Id.
126. CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960

PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 1-10 (Cambridge University Press 2006).
127. Id. at 20.
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of standing under Article III is necessary as a preface to a discussion
of the case.

II. Standing
A. Frothingham v. Mellon
Frothingham v. Mellon 128 is the starting point for an analysis of
standing in federal court under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. It
is the leading case in the 20th century on the issue and provides
clarification for some aspects of the Warth decision. In fact,
Frothingham provides some credibility to some parts of Powell's
decision.
In Frothingham, taxpayers attacked the constitutionality of the
alleging, inter alia, that Congress had
Maternity Act of 1921,
exceeded its delegated powers and invaded the state sovereignty
granted by the Tenth Amendment.' 30 The taxpayers alleged that "to
increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take ... property
without due process of law" was unconstitutional. 13 1 The Court
rejected the taxpayer's arguments and denied standing in federal
court regarding the constitutional challenge to the Maternity Act:
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then
every other taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of
the statute here under review, but also in respect of every
other appropriation act and statute whose administration
of public money, and whose validity may
requires the outlay
132
questioned.
be
The Court, in Frothingham, decided that the barrier that
prevented taxpayers from obtaining standing in court was a policy
consideration and not really an issue of constitutionality.133 The
Court explained the policy consideration when the Court commented
upon the relationship between taxpayer and the federal government.
and the federal government is
This relationship between a 'taxpayer
34
described as "very different."'
128. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id.
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It is a relationship, the Court stressed that "is shared with
millions of others," and "is comparatively minute and
indeterminable."' 135 In other words, if one taxpayer is able to obtain
standing in federal court challenging the constitutionality of an
appropriation, the number of lawsuits that would have to be heard in
federal courts around the country would increase significantly.
The Court, in Frothingham, also made it clear that the taxpayers
did not have real claims that consisted of real measurable injuries.
The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not
only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
36 in
some indefinite way in common with people generally. 1
This language in Frothinghamforms the basic foundation for the
development of Article III standing before the Court in future cases.
B. Flast v. Cohen
The second case that provides the foundation for Article III
standing is Flast v. Cohen.137 Flast is another taxpayer lawsuit.
Flast sought to define and interpret the same legal principles
enunciated in Frothingham.
In Flast, taxpayers complained about Title I and Title II of the
Elementary and Secondary School Act.' 38 The taxpayers alleged that
the statute violated "the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment."' 39 The Court described the issues at stake as
follows:
The gravamen of the appellants' complaint was that federal
funds appropriated under the Act were being used to finance
instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in
religious schools, and to purchase textbooks.., and other
instructional materials for use in such schools. Such
expenditures were alleged to be in contravention of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. Appellants' constitutional attack focused on the
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 487.
Id.
392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Id. at 85-86.
Id.
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statutory criteria which state and local authorities
must meet
140
to be eligible for federal grants under the Act.
The lasting significance of Flast is that the case decided if
taxpayers could have standing in federal court. The precedent
established by the Court in Frothingham stood as an "impenetrable
barrier to suits" prior to Flast.14 1 Flast provided an opening for
taxpayers to sue in federal court.
In addition, Flast is important because it provided a much more
modem discussion of standing under Article III. As Justice Warren
wrote in his opinion, "the judicial power of federal courts is
constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies' . . . words,"
he describes as possessing an "iceberg quality.', 142 Warren also
stressed that these concepts contain "submerged complexities 143
which
go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government.'
Warren wrote that the cases and controversies doctrine manifests
itself as a "term of art" known as "justiciability.' 144 His discussion in
Flast of this concept also provides further clarification of the
concepts the Court and Justice Powell would confront in Warth:
Justiciability is itself a concept of uncertain meaning and
scope. Its reach is illustrated by the various grounds upon
which questions sought to be adjudicated in federal courts
have been held not to be justiciable. Thus, no justiciable
controversy is presented when the parties seek adjudication
of only a political question, when the parties are asking for an
advisory opinion, when the question sought to be adjudicated
has been mooted by subsequent developments,
and when
45
there is no standing to maintain the action.1
Ultimately, the Court in Flastheld that taxpayers could possibly
have standing in federal court if the taxpayers satisfied a two-part
test. 146 The holding added that the taxpayers bringing the lawsuit in
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. at 85 Justice Earl Warren wrote the majority opinion in Flast.
Id. at 85-86.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 102. In the test established in Flast,the Court stated the following:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the
type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper
party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional
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federal court needed to establish a "nexus"'147 between their status as
taxpayers, the legislation and the alleged constitutional infringement.
This clarified the ability of taxpayers and more than likely many
others seeking to maintain a lawsuit federal court. Flast brings the
discussion to the last and a very important standing
case for purposes
148
of this Warth analysis: Sierra Club v. Morton.
C. Sierra Club v. Morton
In Sierra Club, the Sierra Club filed suit against the U.S.
Department of Interior alleging that various aspects of the proposed
development of Mineral King Valley in the Sierra Nevada Mountains
in Tulare County, California, contravened federal laws and
regulations governing the preservation of national parks, forests, and
game refuges. 149 Sierra Club's lawsuit, inter alia, sought compliance
with these laws. The issue again was whether Sierra Club had
standing to bring the action in federal court, or as the Court makes
clear in the case: "whether the Sierra Club ha[d] alleged facts that
entitle[d] it to judicial review of the challenged action."T30 The Court
also referred to the issue as "whether a par% ha[d] a sufficient stake
in an otherwise justiciable controversy. ' '
This language was
consistent with Justice Warren's analysis in Flast.'52
The Sierra Club, in its legal actions against Morton requested "a
declaratory judgment and an injunction to restrain federal officials"
from taking action that would lead to damage to the aesthetic value of
the proposed area and the ecology of the specific area to be
developed.153 The action did have problems.
power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. 1, 8, of the Constitution.
It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute. This requirement is
consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in
federal courts in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the
precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this
requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment
is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. 1, 8.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
405 U.S. 727 (1972).
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 730.
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First, no members of the Sierra Club were allegedly affected by
the development nor would be affected by the development. 154 More
importantly, Sierra Club did not actually allege any "individualized
harm to itself or its members." 1 55 With regard to the fundamental
principles of standing, the need for a "nexus" between the actions and
the harm incurred, Sierra Club seemed to fail the test easily because
56
of the absence of harm to any specific member of the organization.'
Nevertheless, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction
57
in the case though the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the reversal and ruled that the
organization, in its corporate capacity, lacked standing to bring the
action, but that the organization could sue on behalf of any of its
members who had individual standing because the
58 government action
affected their aesthetic or recreational interests. 1
Sierra Club analysis provides interesting parallels to the Warth
holding. Sierra Club is similar to Warth because Warth also
contained an association as a plaintiff in the case amongst many
plaintiffs. 159 However, unlike Sierra Club, the strongest plaintiffs in
Warth were individuals who could cite harm that could be linked
specifically to the actions of the city to prevent the building of a
certain kind of residence that would have made housing available to
them. Even though the individuals were not subject to the ordinance
directly in Warth because they did not build or develop real property,
their interests were16016
directly affected by decisions perpetuated by the
zoning
ordinance.
Sierrabetween
Club lacked
suchlawsuits.
a relationship.16 1 This
was the principle difference
the two
III. Warth
A. Carr'sPreliminary Memorandum
The Warth decision, for Powell, within the machinations of the
Court, began on the day that the Court decided to accept the case for
review. Powell wrote notes relating to the issues in the case directly

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 735.
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 736.
Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Sierra, 405 U.S. at.727.
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on the conference documents for the case. 162 One of Powell's law
clerks at the time, Ron Carr, also took extensive notes on the case and
drafted detailed memoranda on the case. 163 Powell and Carr's
writings on the case both shed light on the constitutional issues
presented to the Court. Carr's role in the case is also critical to
understanding how Powell handled the case internally.
Carr, like any law clerk to Supreme Court Justice, was an
important figure in the Court's judicial process. The rise in
importance of law clerks was also one of the single important
evolutionary developments within the Supreme Court and one of the
more controversial. r64 At the time of Warth it was "more common
than not for justices to solicit the views of their clerks on the merits
of cases."' 65 In addition, while many factors influence a decision of a
justice, "clerks pay a crucial role behind the scenes"' 66 on the Court.
The late Justice William Rehnquist, a clerk on the Court in 1957
believed clerks had too much influence as far back as 1957.167
Rehnquist believed this so much that he wrote an article on the topic
that is published in U.S. News and World Report at the time.
Ron Carr's work with Powell is important to the Warth decision.
Powell acknowledged that Ron Carr was his "principal adviser" 168 in
cases involving "[fjederal jurisdiction."' 69 Warth is a federal
jurisdiction case. Despite this pronouncement regarding Carr's role
as a law clerk on the Court, Powell's opinion was opposite of Carr's
review of the case on several critical points.
Carr initially prepared a "Preliminary Memorandum"' 70
(hereinafter "the Carr Memorandum") for Powell in Warth that was
used to review the petition for certiorari. The Carr Memorandum was
a cogent argument presented in great detail that included important
notes that Powell recorded on the document.
The Carr Memorandum explained in detail the actions of the
town of Penfield that led to the Warth lawsuit. According to the Carr
Memorandum, the plaintiffs alleged that the zoning laws of the town
162. See e.g., Warth v. Seldin Certiorari Conference Documents, supra note 95; Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Warth v. Seldin Conference Notes (Mar. 19, 1975) (on file with author).

163. See Warth v. Seldin Preliminary Memorandum from Ron Carr to Justice Powell (Sept.
11, 1974) (collected papers on file with author) (hereinafter "the Carr Memorandum").
164. ARTEMUS WARD AND DAVID WEIDEN, SORCERER'S APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 21, New York University Press 2006.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id.at 6.
Id.
at 167.
Id.

170. The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165.
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"violated the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth amendments" of the U.S.
Constitution and also sections 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981, 1982, and
1983.171 It was not just the ordinance on its face that violated the
law, the Carr Memorandum added; the actions of the town in
enforcing their laws were also a violation. Carr summarized the
ordinance's effect as follows: "The ordinance earmarks 98 percent of
the town's vacant land for single family housing. Because of the
ordinance's house setback, lot size, floor area and habitable space
requirements, it is impossible to build such housing except
at a price
72
far in excess of what low-income persons can afford."
In addition, the plaintiffs, according to Carr, alleged that only
"three tenths of one percent of vacant land is available for multifamily structures, but even on this limited space, low and middle
income housing is precluded by low density and other
requirements."' 173 The complaint also alleged that the town applied
the ordinance "in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner," and
delayed action "on proposals for multi-racial, low and moderate
174
housing for inordinate periods of time" through various means.
The various plaintiffs asked for the Court to declare the ordinance
illegal, an injunction to prevent enforcement of the zoning ordinance,
75
the enactment of an acceptable ordinance, and monetary damages.1
The Carr Memorandum expressed Carr's trouble with the
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals decision that upheld the denial
of standing by the District Court. Carr discussed the problems with
that holding within the context of the petition presented by the
plaintiffs who sought relief in Warth. In the memorandum section
entitled "Discussion," Carr described the petition presented to the
Court as presenting "a variety of distinct problems." 7 6 Carr added
that the Court
of Appeals' "analysis [was] not entirely
177
satisfactory."'

The most critical of these problems with the lower court ruling
was exposed when Carr discussed the plaintiffs in Warth who were

171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.According to the Carr Memorandum," some actions included "denying approval of

proposals for arbitrary reasons," "refusing to grant necessary variances, permits and tax
abatements," "failing to provide necessary support services for low and moderate housing," and
"amending the zoning ordinance to make approval of such housing projects 'virtually
impossible."'
175. Id. at 3.

176. Id. at 8.
177. Id.at 8. Carr referred to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit as "CA2."
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described as "Potential Penfield Residents."' 178 Those were the
individuals who sought housing in Penfield but did not locate suitable
housing as a result of the policies of the city. Carr described the
analysis of the Court of Appeals as "questionable."' 79 Carr
contended that the harm suffered by those individuals was
"immediate and personal" and are "within the zone of interests
protected by the constitutional and statutory provisions."' 80 Although
the plaintiffs, for the most part, were not specifically linked to any
housing project under construction in Penfield, that, in no
181 way, at
least in Carr's view, should affect standing in federal court.
Carr also had problems with the Court of Appeals' analysis that
denied standing to the taxpayers. Carr contended that there was a
clear link between the actions of the city and the harm to the
82
taxpayers despite the policy issues presented by such a decision.,
The Carr Memorandum stated the problem as follows: "Assuming
that S.C.R.A.P. is applicable to other than environmental cases, it is
difficult to see how the causal chain alleged there is any more
attenuated than that alleged here."' 83
Carr resolved the issue by not relying upon S.C.R.A.P. 184 in the
legal evaluation with respect to the taxpayers. Carr did not utilize the
S.C.R.A.P. analysis but opted for the legal holding used in a case
referred to in his memorandum as "Data Processing."'85 Data
Processing is an important standing case for understanding the
discussions between Justice Powell and Carr regarding the resolution
of the issue in Warth.
Data Processing involved organizations, a corporation, and an
association that represented data processors, that sought a "review" of
a "ruling" of the Comptroller of the Currency "that national banks...
could make data processing services available to other banks and to
banks' customers."' 186 The district court dismissed the action for
review for lack of standing.' 87 The United States Court of Appeals
178. Idat 9. Carr described these individuals as "low income, black and Puerto Rican
residents of Rochester, who claim that they have sought housing in Penfield, but because of the
town's zoning laws, all available housing is beyond their means." Id. at 3.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id.
181. Id. Carr believed the challenge was more a challenge of "ripeness" and not standing.
182. Id. at 8.

183. Id.
184. U.S. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
(recognizing standing of the student organization).
185. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
186. Id. at 150-51.
187. Id. at 154.
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for the 88Eighth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted
review. 1
The Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts and iranted the
plaintiffs in Data Processing standing to review the ruling.

89

Justice

William 0. Douglas, in his majority opinion, wrote that the question
in standing determinations was "whether the interest sought to be
protected... is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
' 90
or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'
The Court held that the statute in Data Processing, The
Administrative Procedures Act, did grant standing to "a person
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant
statute."' 91

It is difficult to conclude that Carr was being creative, clever, or
correct in his suggestion to Powell that he use the "zone of interest"
test.1 92 It is also not that persuasive that Data Processing actually
solves the problems Carr identifies. While the use of this standard
from Data Processingresolved the issue with regard to the taxpayers
in Warth, it did not dismiss the potential residents from the lawsuit
because those plaintiffs were within the constitutional zone of
protection as well as within the zone of
193 interests that the statutes
identified in the complaint seek to cover.
At the end of the Carr Memorandum, Carr's handwritten notes
1 94
provide more insight into the development of the Warth decision.
Carr repeated his call to Powell to use the "zone of interests" standard
as enunciated in Data Processingbut more importantly, asserted that
refusing standing to the potential residents of Penfield, cannot be
96
justified.19 5 Carr wrote: "as to standing, there is a conflict here."'
Although admitting that the plaintiffs do not have "much of a case on
the merit" and that he would "hate to formulate the decree" being
sought, Carr added that those considerations are "quite apart from
standing."'' 97 The inference here by Carr is the plaintiffs have alleged
enough in their complaint to be granted standing.
Carr's final statement in his handwritten notes is most revealing
188. Id.
189. Id. at 150.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 8.
193. Id. According to the Carr Memorandum, the plaintiffs sued for violations of the U.S.
Constitution as well as violations of several federal civil rights laws. Id. at 1.
194. See id. at 10.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 11.
197. Id. at 10-11.
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with respect to the lower court decisions and Powell's decision as
well. Carr wrote, "I suspect that the real basis for CA2's decision
was a thoroughly understandable timidity about reaching the
merits.' 1 98 This statement contains the real problem in Warth; a set
of worthwhile plaintiffs, namely the low-income black and Puerto
Ricans who wanted to integrate Penfield, were denied an opportunity
to pursue actionable claims within the zone of interests that can be
linked to the actions of the city officials.
B. The Bobtail Memorandum
Ron Carr's role in the Warth opinion did not end with the
Preliminary Memorandum.
In fact, his second memorandum,
entitled, "The Bobtail Memorandum,"
is even more detailed and
opinionated than the first memorandum. This document is dated
March 17, 1975, the same date of oral argument. 200 It was Carr's best
effort to suggest or recommend how Justice Powell should vote in the
case. The Bobtail Memorandum also contained many of the same
arguments and discussions as were contained in the first
memorandum. Most importantly, however, Carr, who Powell claims
was his law clerk of choice on the issue of federal jurisdiction, 20 1 set
forth a discussion of standing at the very beginning of the
memorandum that was even more specific and exacting. Carr, usinm
2
cases as support, explained the standing doctrine in explicit detail. A
Carr also was careful to allude to conclusions regarding the doctrine
that Powell
20 3 supported in order to explain the principles underlying
standing.
Carr began by reminding Powell that as he "observed in
Richardson2 4 the question of standing includes two discrete
inquiries.~205 The first, according to Carr, is "whether the plaintiff
has made out a 'case or controversy.' 206 Carr asserted that the
"purpose of this requirement is to ensure that Article III courts will
exercise judicial review power and afford a remedy only when there

198. Id. at 11.

199. Warth v. Seldin Bobtail Memorandum from Ron Carr to Justice Powell (Mar. 17, 1975)
(on file with author) (hereinafter "the Bobtail Memorandum").
200. Id. at 1.
201. WARD AND WEIDEN, Supra note 166, at 167.

202. The Bobtail Memorandum, supra note 201, at 1-7.
203. Id. at 7.
204. U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
205. The Bobtail Memorandum, supra note 201, at 2.

206. Id.
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is a conflict between the parties in fact. 20 7 Carr added that the
"requirement" is "satisfied when the plaintiff alleges and
subsequently demonstrates that he is suffering present harm." 20 8 Carr
insisted that this was the critical point - the present harm, as he
referred to it as "harm," that was "almost" a "proximate cause.' ,,209 In
other words, if the defendant's actions are removed, there would be
no harm at all.
Carr also asserted in his second memorandum that plaintiffs have
to overcome certain "prudential" limitations presented by the
standing issues.210 This discussion was also important to the final
decision in Warth. For Carr, there were two specific prudential
limitations: The first was whether or not the harm is the kind of harm
that the Constitution, statute, or the legal obligation was designed to
protect; and the second Carr calls the "Hohfeldian" limitation 11 or a
limitation that basically states that even though the harm was real, if
it was "shared by the public generally, 212 in "equal measure, 213 the
Court usually does not have to grant standing to such plaintiffs. With
those principles in mind, Carr evaluated each plaintiff that was before
the Court.
With respect to the taxpayers, Carr immediately dismissed them
as lacking standing by asserting that the plaintiffs "failed to allege
that any part of their tax burden is the direct result of defendants'
actions. ' 214 The taxpayers also had great difficulty overcoming the
"Hohfeldian" limitation because they were the kind of plaintiffs who
the limitation seemed to describe. Carr did not mention the limitation
in his review but that was perhaps because the taxpayers did not even
meet the lower threshold for establishing standing in federal court
under many of the leading cases.215
Carr handled Metro Act, one of the builder plaintiffs in Warth, in
a similar fashion. Carr was very skeptical of Metro Act's assertion of
standing but ultimately believed that their claims were in no way
unique because all residents of the city of Penfield shared the same
216
burden.
This was, again,
an attempt
by Carr to dismiss a plaintiff
using the "Hofeldian"
limitation
language.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.at4.
Id.
at6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 7.
Id.
at8.
Id.at 13-14.
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The plaintiffs that Carr discussed in great detail in his second
memorandum were Rochester Home Builders Association, Housing
Council and the low-income, black and Puerto Rican plaintiffs who
sought housing in Penfield. With respect to Rochester Home
Builders, it was clear to Carr that there was some merit to their claim
of standing.
Carr sought to fashion a scenario where they might have been
granted standing on their claims.217 Carr easily dismissed Housing
Council's claim of standing but found that Rochester Home Builders
have "alleged... sufficient harm to survive "a motion to dismiss for
want of standing." 2 18 Carr, however, expressed problems with how
the claims were worded.
Carr wrote that their claim was for damages even though
Rochester Home Builders was an association and Carr knew of "no
case in which a membersh9 organization had been allowed to bring
an action for damages.
It would have been much more
compelling if the association sought "prospective relief' 220 in Carr's
view. In order to receive damages, the association would have had to
name members worthy of relief in the form of actual damages. This
discussion by Carr provided support for the position that those
organizations, while worthy to a degree with respect to standing,
perhaps could not meet the legal threshold because of the inherent
flaws in the complaint.
The low-income black and Puerto Rican residents of Rochester
presented the most difficulty for Carr. Those plaintiffs claims
challenged the constitutionality of the city ordinance under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Constitution forbade the specific conduct that the town of
Penfield was engaged in with the enactment and enforcement of the
ordinance
that was denying them an opportunity to reside in the
222
city.

Carr conceded early on that if the low-income black and Puerto
Rican residents of Rochester plaintiffs could satisfy the standing
requirements under Article III, they could also withstand a prudential
standing
claim. 223 Those
werelink
notthea actions
set thatbycould
be
deemed "Hofeldian"
as theyplaintiffs
could easily
the city

217. Id. at 8-9.
218. Id. at 12.
219. Id.

220. Id.
221. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493.
222. Id.
223. The Bobtail Memorandum, supra note 201, at 8.
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to the harm they were suffering. 224 Although Carr acknowledged that
the claims asserted by the plaintiffs were "highly conclusory," 225 he
also contended that if the zoning ordinance
226 were removed, "low
income housing would be built in Penfield.9
Further, Carr, while admitting that there was some speculation to
the claim of the plaintiffs that they would be able to move into
Penfield, but for the ordinance, also contended that those plaintiffs
did not have to demonstrate that level of proof with respect to
standing. They have demonstrated, according to Carr, "a logical
connection...
between the assertedly illegal practices and the harm
2 27
to them."

C. Powell's Conference Memorandum
Following oral argument, Ron Carr's analysis and comments on
the standing issue in Warth were already circulating to the other
Justices. This was primarily because Powell's memorandum to the
228
conference (hereinafter "Powell's Conference Memorandum")
contained the same legal conclusions Carr put forth in his
memorandum. In fact, the documents were nearly identical in
content.
Powell expressed to the other Justices his view of the case
overall and his opinions with respect to all of the individual sets of
plaintiffs. While nearly all of the plaintiffs were denied standing for
various reasons, Powell revealed to the conference that Car believed,
and provided support for, the position that the low-income, black and
Puerto Rican residents of Rochester, met the standing requirements
required by the Court.229 Powell's note on those plaintiffs in his
memo stated the following:
Await discussion. Ron, recognizing that the issue is close and
largely one of judgment, thinks he would hold the plaintiffs
have standing. He notes that, for standing purposes, we must
assume that the ordinance and its' application are
unconstitutional; that these plaintiffs allege they are suffering
present harm; and that they make allegations of repeated
224. Id. at 8-9.
225. Id. at 9.
226. Id. at 10.

227. Id.
228. Memorandum from Justice Powell to the Conference (Mar. 19, 1975) (on file with
author) (hereinafter "Powell's Conference Memorandum").
229. Id. at 2-3.
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230

This is important. It suggests that Powell was not convinced that
this set of plaintiffs was treated fairly.
Powell added language that Carr provided regarding the
speculative nature of the lawsuit. Powell's Conference Memorandum
by suggesting that the low-income, black and Puerto Rican residents
of Rochester probably did not have standing because they did not
demonstrate that they would become tenants in Penfield if the
ordinance were lifted.
This argument is troubling. Powell relies upon this argument to
deny that the low income, black and Puerto Rican residents of
Rochester an opportunity to pursue their claim. As Carr stated in the
Carr Memorandum, the strength of the residents' claims on the merits
is "a matter quite apart from standing., 232 However, Powell,
wavering with respect to those plaintiffs at conference, injects
comments into the debate that were potentially damaging to the
prospects of a favorable vote for that set of plaintiffs on review. The
fact that Carr believed that the claims were weak was prejudicial to
the issue before the Court. Carr, in fact, believed that the claims were
weak but that standing was separate from the claims put forth by the
parties.

IV. The Powell Opinion
A. Potter Stewart
The real judicial leader in the Warth decision was Justice Potter
Stewart. Powell wrote the opinion but Stewart, judging by Powell's
notes from conference was the justice who took command of final
resolution of the case.233 The conference notes were grouped by each
justice that voted at the conference with their overall vote and
included additional notes that Powell must have believed were
relevant. Stewart's opinion with respect to the plaintiffs was so
forceful, at least according to Powell's notes, that even if one felt
strongly about any of the plaintiffs, Potter will produce doubt in one's
mind.
With respect to the Rochester taxpayers, Powell records "no

230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 2.
Id. at3.
The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 11.
Warth v. Seldin Conference Notes, supra note 164.
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standing" in Stewart's box.2 34 The organizations, according to
Stewart, as Powell's notes, have no standing as well though Stewart
believed that a member of the organization could have had standing if
they had been "denied a permit & gone through administrative
appeals. 235
Surprisingly, the low-income plaintiffs, the plaintiffs in the best
position to achieve standing according to Ron Carr, were also
dismissed away easily by Stewart, according to Powell. "Not even
our most 'far out case,' justifies standing," 236 Powell recorded as
Stewart's position in Stewart's box. 237 Stewart supported this
position by declaring that the case was an Article III case and was not
a case involving a statute. How Stewart reached the conclusion that
the case did not involve a statute is difficult to understand under the
facts.
This is most unfortunate considering that Stewart was able to
influence Powell and Justice Harry Blackmun that his theory of the
legal issues in the case was correct. The Carr Memorandum detailed
the various civil rights statutes that the plaintiffs invoked as the basis
for the unconstitutional nature of the ordinance that kept low income
housing from being constructed in Penfield.238 Stewart also ignored
portion of the United States Constitution relating to individual rights.
Yet, more troubling was the fact that Powell accepted this legal
argument.
Stewart convinced Blackmun of this view. In conference,
Blackmun voted to go along with Stewart.239 Powell, likewise, also
voted to affirm, and wrote simply: "I agree with Potter., 24' Did
Powell also believe that the case does not involve a statute with
respect to the low-income minority plaintiffs? There is no indication
of Powell's opinion of this issue.
Stewart's vote and opinion was also troublesome because he
suggested that one of the organizational members should have gone
through the process of applying for a building permit to construct
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 1. The complaint, according to Carr,
alleged that the Penfield ordinance violated 42 U.S.C §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983, all well-known
civil rights statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 is a civil rights statute that concerns property rights. It
states: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as
is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982(a) (2000).
239. Warth v. Seldin Conference Notes, supra note 164.
240. Id.
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24 1
housing in Penfield and been denied in order to obtain standing.
The problem with such an approach was that the potential tenants of
the project were not able to obtain standing under such an approach.
Their potential residency in the proposed project would have still
been speculative and would not have advanced any standing claim.

B. Justice Powell and the Nixon Legacy
The other affirming votes in Warth are, of course, expected, and
are more independent in nature. Chief Justice Warren Burger
believed the matter was a political question.242 Justice Rehnquist, a
solid ideological conservative, believed the complaint was "too
vague" and that the petitioners had no "case or controversy. 243 The
Court's vote was 5-3 in favor of affirming the decision. 2 " Justice
William 0. Douglas did not vote in the conference because he had
recently suffered a severe and debilitating stroke in December
1974. 241 The vote
again:votd
Rehnquist, Burger,
andtallyowel
•246 Blackmun, Stewart,
and Powell voted to affirm; Brennan, White, and Marshall, voted
for reversal.
Powell wrote the majority opinion for the Court and much of his
opinion was influenced by the writings and discussion provided by
his law clerk, Ron Carr. Powell handled the most difficult plaintiffs
first - the low-income minorities. It was that group of plaintiffs
who Carr indicated, at least in his memoranda, had standing to pursue
their claims even if the allegations were weak.2 47 Carr's view, as
stated plainly the Carr Memorandum, was that whether the claim was
strong was not the issue; the issue was whether absent the actions of
the city of Penfield these plaintiffs might have had the opportunity to

241. Id.
242. Id. See also, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (leading opinion on the political
question doctrine).
243. Warth v. Seldin Conference Notes, supra note 164.
244. Id.
245. Douglas suffered the stroke while on vacation in the Bahamas on December 31, 1974.
He eventually voted with the minority in the case making the decision a 5-4 decision. Supreme
Court Justices, William 0. Douglas, 1898-1980, http://www.michaelariens.com/ConLaw/
justices/douglas.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
246. Justice Byron Raymond White served on the Court from 1962-1993; Justice Thurgood
Marshall served on the Court from 1967-1991. Timeline of the Justices: Byron R. White: 19621993, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02-history/subs -timeline/images -associates/079.html
(last visited Feb. 17, 2009); Timeline of the Justices: Thurgood Marsahll, 1967-1991,
http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02-history/subs-timeline/images-associates/082.htm
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
247. The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 9-10.
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reside in Penfield.248 Powell, however, placed a burden on the
plaintiffs so enormous that he endorsed exclusionary zoning
practices.
Powell wrote that the low-income residents had to demonstrate
that they had been "personally injured., 249 Plaintiffs must, according
to Powell, demonstrate the requisite case and controversy
requirement under Article 111.250 This is true, but Powell took the
standing requirement a step further. His opinion re-defined the
standing requirement. Powell's opinion, in relevant part, states:
None of them has ever resided in Penfield; each claims at
least implicitly that he desires, or has desired, to do so. Each
asserts, moreover, that he made some effort, at some time, to
locate housing in Penfield that was at once within his means
and adequate for his family's
needs. Each claims that his
25 1
efforts proved fruitless.
Powell essentially required that the plaintiffs demonstrate that
they would likely prove their case against the city of Penfield when
Article III makes no such requirement.
Powell also imposed a burden on the plaintiffs that is illogical in
nature. The zoning ordinance in Penfield prevented the construction
of low-income housing. The plaintiffs collectively alleged that if the
ordinance were not in effect, the low-income housing would be
constructed and they would seek to obtain housing in the city at one
of the developments. Powell contended that the speculative nature of
that process precluded the plaintiffs from pursuing their claim in
court. However, the plaintiffs are not required to dismiss all manner
of doubt regarding their claims just to have the claims heard in court.
Or in other words, was Powell claiming that these plaintiffs need to
demonstrate that if low-income housing were built, they would most
likely obtain housing?
This appears to be the case.
Powell wrote early in the opinion that Article III "exists only to
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining
party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others
collaterally., 252 Powell further elaborated that a party "may have
standing to seek relief on the basis of the legal rights and interests of
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Warih, 422 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 499.
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others, and, indeed, may invoke the general public interest in support
of their claim." 253 In addition, Powell added the following to provide
further clarification of the law:
Petitioners must allege and show that they personally have
been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other,
unidentified members of the class to which they belong and
which they purport to represent. Unless these petitioners can
thus demonstrate the requisite case or controversy between
themselves personally and respondents, 'none may seek254relief
on behalf of himself or any other member of the class.'
Despite the pronouncement of these legal standards, Powell's
demands on the blacks and Puerto Rican plaintiffs were much more
stringent.
Powell maintains that the claims asserted by these
plaintiffs were really the claims of others and not the claims of the
black and Puerto Rican low-income potential residents.255
Powell asserted that the claims of these plaintiffs were really the
claims of "third parties - developers, builder[s] ... ,256 He further
added that the plaintiffs might have wanted to reside in Penfield but
they had never actually been denied any housing by the city.257 The
developers were denied an opportunity to build housing and that was
how these plaintiffs were allegedly denied the opportunity to reside in

the

city. 258

There were only two efforts to build housing in Penfield that
could have been linked to the desires of these particular plaintiffs to
reside in the city. However, the submitted affidavits suggested that
the plaintiffs would not have been able to afford to reside in these
developments. 259 Powell used these facts to conclude that the
plaintiffs were not denied housing in Penfield on the account of race
but because they could not afford to reside in Penfield based upon the
information provided to the court.26 ° Powell wrote: "Indeed,
petitioners' descriptions of their individual financial situations and
housing needs suggest precisely the contrary-that their inability to
reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the area
253. Id. at 501.
254. Id. at 502 (quoting Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 32 (1962)).

255. Id. at 504.
256. Id.

257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 506-07, n.16.
260. Id. at 507.
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261
housing market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts."
This is the most controversial portion of the case.
Powell's argument is strong evidence that Powell was not basing
his position on constitutional jurisprudence but was advancing the
federal housing policy of President Richard Nixon, the individual
who appointed him to the Supreme Court. The Nixon housing policy
is worthy of a brief discussion as well in order to understand the
implications of the policy and how that policy is implicated in Warth.
Richard Nixon's housing policy has its origins in Nixon's
political aspirations to become President of the United States in 1968.
Nixon, who lost narrowly to John F. Kennedy in the 1960 election,
invoked the famous "Southern strategy '262 in an effort to win the
election. The strategy eventually evolved into housing policy under
Nixon in an effort to win the 1968 election by appealing to white
Southerners and suburban whites around the country by using race.
It began initially in 1967 when the passage of a Fair Housing
Act 63 became a strong possibility. Nixon publically asserted that
opposition to the proposed fair housing law was shared by the
majority of Americans in the U.S. 264 Nixon elaborated on this
opinion the following year when he stated further that the Fair
Housing Act would not assist many African Americans and
265that the
"liberals."
by
gesture
a
was
law
housing
fair
a
pass
effort to
The Nixon doctrine soon encompassed race and class once he
of
was elected President. 66 His appointee to the U.S. Department 267
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), George Romney
expressed a strong commitment to integration in his housing policy.
One of his statements on the issue addressed the specific issue
presented in the Warth case: "The most explosive threat to our nation

261. Id.
262. Mike Allen, RNC ChiefSays It Was Wrong to Exploit Racial Conflictfor Votes, WASH.
POST, July 14, 2005 at A04. (The strategy "described Republican efforts to use race as a wedge
issue - on matters such as desegregation and busing - to appeal to white southern voters").
263. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
264. LAMB, supra note 128, at 108-17.
265. Id. at 111-17.
266. Id.
267. George Wilcken Romney was born in a Mormon colony in Mexico in 1907. His
parents, American citizens, had moved there after the U.S. Congress outlawed polygamy in the
1880s. Romney's parents eventually relocated back to the U.S. and Romney was raised in Idaho
and Utah. Romney, who never graduated from college, became a political speechwriter in
Congress, a lobbyist for the aluminum industry, and a representative for the automobile industry
as well. Romney was elected governor of Michigan in 1962 and was re-elected in 1964 and 1966.
Romney unsuccessfully ran for President in 1968 but was named to the Nixon cabinet to serve as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. David Rosenbaum,
George Romney dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1995.
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is the confrontation between the poor and the minority groups who
are concentrated in the central cities, and the middle income and
affluent who live in the surrounding and separate communities. This
2 68
confrontation is divisive. It is explosive. It must be resolved.
Romney actually attempted to implement policies when the federal
government
would try to achieve the goals of the Fair Housing
2 69
Act.

Nixon claimed to oppose segregation but his position on the
issue was much more complex and is ultimately divisive. His
exploitation of his own HUD Secretary, Romney, is demonstrative of
this point. Nixon appointed Romney as his HUD Secretary but
undermined him throughout his tenure. 27 Nixon also made it clear
that he did not support suburban segregation.
Nixon presented two significant memoranda that clarified his
views on housing policy.27 1 These statements provide evidence of
Nixon's opposition to suburban segregation and by default, his strong
support for the actions of cities like Penfield that designed policies to
prevent racial integrated housing in their municipalities.
In the two memos, both prepared for his Chief of Staff, John
Ehrlichman, Nixon made it abundantly clear that he was not in favor
through
of "forced integration" and believed that forced integration
' 272
housing is as wrong as "legally sanctioned segregation."
In addition, Nixon was adamantly opposed to integration through
the construction of public housing units in residential neighborhoods
with homeowners.2 73 Nixon advised Ehrlichman that he did not
agree that the law should propose housing integration when
individuals residing in the proposed areas were not "willing to
support" such proposals.274 He further advised Ehrlichman that he
amendment "forbidding forced busing
was in favor of a constitutional
275
and housing integration.
At the root of the Nixon doctrine on housing and integration was
Nixon's racist beliefs. 276 Those beliefs formed Nixon's policy on
268. John A. Powell, Reflecting on the Past,Looking at the Future: The FairHousing Act at
40, 41 IND. L.J. 605, 607 (2008).
269. LAMB, supra note 128, at 56-62
270. Id. at 108-17.
271. Id. at 115-17.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 116-20. See also, Earl Ofari Hutchinson, The Nixon Tapes, Racism and
Republicans, AlterNet, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.alternet.org/columnists/story/17422/ (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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suburban integration and prevented any serious efforts by Romney
from being successful in any of his own efforts to follow through on
the mandate of the Fair Housing Act for racial integrated housing.
But regardless of the validity of the Nixon doctrine, when the
issue is housing, the interests of individuals cannot be separated from
the housing developers and builders. This is the major problem with
the Warth decision. The zoning ordinance does ultimately affect
individuals though it applies to developers and organizations that
would have to comply with the zoning laws in order to build the
housing. The builders are also affected by the ordinance.
For example, a city passes a zoning law making it illegal to build
any additional buildings in certain parts of a city that contain
wheelchair ramps. The city does not actually name wheelchair ramps
but passes a zoning ordinance that has the effect of denying such
projects.
The law directly impacts the disabled. Yet it is the developers
who develop real property that provides housing to the disabled.
Thus the interests of the developers or housing associations are
intertwined with the interests of the disabled persons who require the
ramps. The two interests cannot be severed. Under Powell's
reasoning, individuals could not obtain standing in federal court
because the ordinance is not directed at them; it is directed at
builders. While this is a more extreme example of a policy choice
that impacts both the housing provider and those seeking housing,
this is precisely the kind of analysis that was missing from Powell's
decision.
Powell invoked a legal standard that the plaintiffs simply could
not demonstrate even under the most favorable circumstances. The
plaintiffs provided the Court with other cases where potential
residents were allowed to proceed to trial on the basis of a housing
development by another party; 2 77 however, Powell decided that
because the ability of these plaintiffs to reside in a development in
Penfield was economically speculative or not likely, the plaintiffs had
no standing to sue in federal court.
C. The Housing Organizations
The arguments used to deny the standing to the the low-income
black and Puerto Rican plaintiffs, provided the foundation for
Powell's legal justification to deny standing to the organization

277. Warth, 422 U.S. at 507-08.
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plaintiffs. Powell acknowledged that an association can maintain
standing on behalf of its members in the opinion;2 78 but then refused
to extend such standing to the three housing organizations in Warth.
Powell handled the first organization, Metro Act, an original
plaintiff, by again asserting that the claims that the named plaintiff
seeks to maintain are the claims of another party. 279 Powell reached
this conclusion even though his analysis in the case did not exclude
Metro Act:
We do not understand Metro-Act to argue that Penfield
residents themselves have been denied any constitutional
rights, affording them a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.§
1983. Instead, their complaint is that they have been harmed
indirectly by the exclusion of others. This is an attempt to
raise putative rights of third parties, and none
of the
280
here.
present
is
claims
such
allow
that
exceptions
However, preceding that portion of Powell's discussion, Powell
admitted that Metro Act might be able to satisfy the case and
controversy requirement under Article 111.281 Powell eluded that this
results by invoking "prudential considerations"2 82 as the reason that
Metro Act could not maintain this action. 283 Powell even admitted
that Metro Act had alleged harm; Powell's legal justification was that
the harm was indirect and that the harm alleged was harm that
excluded others.2 84 Powell's critique of Metro-Act is also troubling
because it completely ignores the purpose of Metro-Act's formation.
The unwillingness of Powell to admit the underlying issue in the
lawsuit - race and class - was self evident by his failure to
acknowledge this central theme.
Metro-Act, Powell was aware, was formed specifically to alter
the "racially exclusionary zoning" practices in Penfield. 8' The
organization was formed following riots in Rochester, New York in
1964.286 Metro-Act, at the time of the Warth litigation, consisted of
278. Warth, 422 U.S. at 508.
279. Id. at 514.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 511.
282. Id. at 514.
Prudential considerations also receive strong discussions in the
memorandum relating to the case in Powell's papers. The Bobtail Memorandum, supra note 201,
at 8-14.

283. Warth, 422 U.S. at 514.
284. Id.

285. Id.
286. The Rochester riots occurred from July 24-26, 1964. "The 'riot' was precipitated by
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"350 individual
members" many of whom resided in the city of
28 7

Penfield.

The organizations attempted to meet with city officials to discuss
288
racially integrated housing in Penfield but met stiff resistance.
Metro-Act also presented proposals to town officials "to end the
racially exclusionary zoning practices and policies existing in
Penfield.

2

89

There was no success.

Thus, Metro-Act filed the

lawsuit seeking a redress of grievances for its members. 290 The
organization's brief was very clear with respect to the reason for the
lawsuit and the legal claims: "As a result of the exclusionary zoning
ordinance and defendants' administration of the law, Metro-Act
members are suffering direct injury in 29
that
they are losing the benefits
1
of living in an integrated community.",

Petitioner Metro Act added that the injury suffered by its
members was "not economic," but was "a real and concrete harm,
resulting directly from defendants' illegal practices and policies. 292
The two other housing organizations, Home Builders and
Housing Council did not succeed either. Home Builders' status, as
an intervener in the case was potentiall problematic because the
complaint was already pending and under the theory eventually
advanced by Powell, the harm would have had to been incurred
directly by Home Builders. However, that status should not have

the arrest of an allegedly drunk and disorderly African-American man at a Joseph Avenue street
dance. But even in its immediate aftermath, many looked to underlying social and environmental
conditions to explain the events that followed. These conditions were analogous to those that
existed in many Northern cities. They included a large and rapid influx of African-Americans
from the South, the de-facto segregation of black arrivals in specific areas of the residential urban
core, a failure to extend economic opportunities from white to black residents, the physical decay
of black neighborhoods due to poverty and inadequate services, the routine exploitation of
African-American tenants by white landlords, the neglect and persecution of blacks at the hands of
an overwhelmingly white police force, inequities in educational instruction and facilities, and the
inability of African-Americans to redress grievances through legitimate political channels.
Rochester's was one of a trio of 'riots' in the summer of 1964. Together, they inaugurated the
'long hot summers' of racial strife that marked the mid and late sixties." The riot ultimately
resulted in $1 million in property damage, 4 deaths, 350 injuries, and 800 arrests. The National
Guard had to be called into service in the city to restore order. Residents and leaders in the city of
Rochester, home to the Eastman Kodak camera company, typically described the moment as "a
blow" to the city's "positive self image." William J. Bulb, Jr. & Allen Grimshaw, Rochester Race
Riot Papers (U. of Rochester ed., 1984) available at http://www.library.rochester.edu/
index.cfm?page=1097.
287. Brief of Petitioners at 13, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), No. 73-2024.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 13-14.
292. Id. at 14.
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precluded Home Builders from presenting a case on the merits.
This portion of the opinion contains evidence that strongly
supports the fact that there was standing in the case. Powell,
however, did not accept many of the very cogent arguments put forth
by the housing developers and their claims were dismissed as well
per Powell's decision and vote to affirm.
D. Petitioners' Arguments
Even with the assertions and seemingly strong influence Justice
Potter Stewart might have had on the Powell's decisions in Warth,
and even with the Nixon administration's housing policy possibly
impacting the resolution of the case, the arguments of the petitioners,
as presented in their briefs, addressed many of the arguments put
forth in Powell's opinion.
The petitioners noted early in their brief of the evidence
presented to the lower court in support of their contentions that
Penfield was engaged in discriminatory conduct. 293 The petitioners
advised the Court that "the conclusion of the experts who have
examined the ordinance [was] un-contradicted and binding upon this
Court.''294 The un-contradicted expert opinion presented to the lower
court described the Penfield zoning ordinance as an "inflexible
control mechanism which has the effect of producing economically
and racially stratified housing arrangements."' 295 Penfield's zoning
ordinance, according to the petitioners, acted as a "complete rejection
by suburban communities of all low and moderate income
housing" 296 and did not take into account the "housing needs either of
its own citizenry
or for the citizenry within the larger metropolitan
2 97
community.,

Petitioners also documented the actual efforts of Penfield to deny
applications under the zoning ordinance. The application of Penfield
Better Homes Corporation was specifically identified in the brief
because the organization was, in fact, a member of "petitioner,
Housing Council., 298 Better Homes' proposal to construct "low and
moderate income housing" was rejected by the city of Penfield for
reasons that were directly contradicted by data provided by the Better
Homes' application. Those included allegations of traffic problems
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id

297. Id
298. Id.
at 7.
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and community non-conformity.2 9 9

The petitioners also cited other proposals rejected by the city of
Penfield when the case was litigating through the lower court.
Finally, petitioners noted city officials also threatened one of the
organizational plaintiffs (Rochester Home Builders) once legal action
against the city seemed certain. 30 0 According to the petitioners, city
officials threatened Home Builders with exclusion from other
business if they insisted upon being included in the legal action
against the city attempting racial integration. 3° '
The petitioners also presented compelling arguments on behalf
of the low-income black and Puerto Rican plaintiffs that documented
the harm suffered by the individual plaintiffs and the relationship of
that harm to the actions of the city. Contrary to Powell's assertions in
his opinion, the plaintiffs did allege harm specifically related to the
city's refusal to allow low- to moderate-income housing to be built in
Penfield. Specifically, the petitioners identified "[p]laintiffs, Ortiz,
Broadnax, Reyes, and Sinkler" as "black or Spanish-surnamed
persons of low or moderate income who have been excluded from the
town of Penfield because of their race and low income level. 30 2
With respect to Ortiz, it is noted that Ortiz resided in Rochester
and was raising his children in a "ghetto environment."30 3 Ortiz's
living environment was one reason, among many, that Ortiz cited as
his motivation for seeking housing in Penfield. Ortiz, while working
in the city of Penfield in the early 1970s, began "searching for
home." 30 4 Due to the lack of housing in Penfield, Ortiz was forced to
reside in Wayland, New York, a city located 42 miles north of
Penfield where Ortiz was employed.3 ' Ortiz was due at work in
Penfield at 7:30 in the morning; his transportation to work often
involved a commute of more than an hour.30 6

The commute

presented increased costs for Ortiz but much more aggravating for
Ortiz was the harm he and his family suffered overall that he
expressed in an affidavit: "Because our living environments are
dictated by laws, practice, and policies which prevent us from living
where we might wish, we are forced for example, to accept as a way
of life, poor schools for our children, reduced job opportunities,
299. Id.
300. Id. at 8.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 9-10.
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inferior community
services and added expenses of reaching
' 30 7
"
employment.
The other individual plaintiffs, Broadnax, Reyes, and Sinkler
alleged similar experiences as Ortiz in seeking housing in Penfield in
their affidavits. Additionally, these plaintiffs alleged exclusion from
residing in Penfield due to their "race and income levels." 30 8 The
plaintiffs all resided in deplorable housing conditions in nearby
Rochester with "uncontrolled violence and insufficient or nonexistent
community services." 30 9 All sought housing in Penfield in an effort
to provide their families with better quality of life, access to better
education for their children, and "decent housing in a decent
environment."3 10 The policy of the city of Penfield to deny permits
on all construction of low- to moderate-income housing effectively
prevented all of these plaintiffs from obtaining housing in a better
community.
In order to reach the decision with respect to these plaintiffs,
Justice Powell ignored or discounted the statements by the
individuals in their affidavits. Powell also had to ignore the
statements of expert witnesses presented on behalf of the
organizational plaintiffs with respect to the various issues raised by
the city. 311 While this evidence may or may not have been enough to
prove the allegations against Penfield, the evidence was enough to
sustain the complaint and have the action proceed to trial.
Powell's law clerk, Ron Carr, stated as much in his analysis of
the case with respect to the low-income black and Puerto Rican
plaintiffs.312
But for the zoning ordinance and how the city
administered the ordinance, low- to moderate-income housing would
have been constructed in Penfield. The plaintiffs likewise would
have had an opportunity to obtain such housing and reside in
Penfield.
Carr, as stated previously, stressed that the law did, in fact,
support standing in favor of the low-income black and Puerto Rican
314
plaintiffs. 3 13 The legal support is contained in the Data Processing
holding that was discussed in Carr's memoranda.
307. Id. at 10.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 11

311. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at519-29. The plaintiffs presented evidence from experts
in support of their case. The information presented by the experts is discussed below in the
Brennan discussion below.
312. The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 9.
313. Id.at8.
314. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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At the time of the Warth litigation, Data Processingwas one of
the key cases involving and interpreting standing. Data Processing
provided a simple definition for standing under Article III that the
plaintiffs in Warth met easily based upon the facts. 315 Justice William
0. Douglas, writing for the majority in Data Processing,stressed that
the question with respect to standing is "whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise." 316 Douglas added that the issue of standing is determined
by "the 'case' or 'controversy' test," or "whether the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question."317 The harm the individual experiences also
does not necessarily have to be "economic" according to Douglas
because the real issue is whether the harm suffered by the individuals
is immediate and personal, as law clerk Ron Carr noted in his
memoranda to Justice Powell.318
The Warth petitioners, inter alia, alleged statutory violations
under the Reconstruction statutes. 319 The harm they alleged was
directly linked to alleged violations of these laws. In addition, the
petitioners presented constitutional claims to the lower court. It was
the violation of the federal statutes and the allegations of violations of
several amendments to the U.S. Constitution that placed the plaintiffs
within the zone of interests protected by these various provisions. If
Powell had used the Data Processing standard, the matter would
have resolved in much simpler manner.
The organizational plaintiffs also met the standard under Data
Processing. Their interests to construct low- to moderate-income
housing in Penfield was within the zone of interests contemplated by
the statutes and the Constitution. The organizational plaintiffs
suffered personal harm as a result of the refusal of the actions of the
zoning board in Penfield.
In addition to petitioner's legal arguments contained in their
briefs, numerous other well-respected organizations filed amicus
briefs in support of the plaintiffs including the National Committee

315. Id. at 152.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 154.
318. Id. See also, The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 9.
319. The Carr Memorandum, supra note 165, at 1. The Reconstruction statutes, passed
following the Civil War, addressed various civic equality issues and African Americans including
equal rights in housing transactions. The statutes include 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, and 1983. The
plaintiffs in the instant case sued under 42 U.S. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983.
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Against Discrimination in Housing ("NCDH"),32 °and the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund ("LDF"). 321 Both offered noteworthy points.
NCDH noted in its amicus brief two intriguing facts. First,
NCDH pointed out that the county where Penfield is located in
Monroe County, New York.322 Within Monroe County, 95 percent of
the African Americans that reside in the county reside in the city of
Rochester. 32 3 Only 1 percent of the African Americans reside in
Penfield, according

to NCDH.

324

This supported the factual

arguments presented by plaintiffs that document their status as
segregated residents of Monroe County in Rochester.
Secondly, and most importantly, NCDH noted a particularly
interesting point regarding the Penfield ordinance. NCDH pointed
out that under the provisions of the ordinance concerning "'planned
unit development,' the ordinance required the builder to consider the
needs of 'existing and potential town residents at all economic
levels."' 325 This point underscored the actions of the city in
promoting residential racial segregation because their actions were
contrary to the purpose of their own ordinance.
The LDF also submitted an amicus brief.326 The arguments of
the organization were historical in nature and also were driven by an
overall examination of the problem of racially motivated
exclusionary zoning. Of particular note is the following excerpt put
forth by LDF: "Notwithstanding applicable Reconstruction
amendments and laws, and long-standing judicial precedent,
exclusionary zoning practices such as lot size, restrictions on multifamily structures, density limitations, and discriminatory grant of
variances persist as barriers to racial integration of metropolitan areas
320. NCDH was founded in 1950 with the objectives of establishing and implementing
programs to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination in housing and to broaden housing
opportunities for minority group members, especially those of lower income. NINA MJAGKI,
ORGANIZING BLACK AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN ASSOCIATES 433
(Taylor & Francis, eds. (2001)).
321. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund is a non-profit corporation, incorporated under the
laws of the State of New York in 1939. It was formed to assist African Americans in securing
their constitutional rights by the prosecution of lawsuits. Its charter declares that its purposes
include rendering legal aid gratuitously to black persons suffering injustice by reason of race who
are unable, on account of poverty, to employ legal counsel on their own behalf. NAACP - Our
Mission, http://www.naacp.org/about/mission/index.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
322. Brief for National Committee Against Discrimination in Housing as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Warth v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (1974) (No. 73-2024) at 3, n.1.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 5, n.3 (emphasis in original).
326. Brief for NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Warth
v. Seldin, 495 F.2d 1187 (1974) (No. 73-2024).
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3 27

LDF's point in this instance was that Powell and the other
members of the Court who voted to deny the challenges to the
ordinance were demonstrating a lack of historical knowledge of the
problem of exclusionary zoning based upon race. LDF cited
the discriminatory
numerous cases where the Court recognized 328
zoning.
exclusionary
motivated
racially
of
impact
In addition, LDF argued that "[r]acial zoning is a particularly
pernicious form of housing discrimination" because it is "wholesale
exclusion" 329 and that to deny standing to the individuals with the
"greatest interest in the eradication of exclusionary policies" because
contrived "strict" standing requirements is
of "artificially"
"anomalous." 33° Again, the LDF view was that the decision by the
Court simply made little sense and was unsupported by legal
precedent and the need for the judicial system to continue to confront
racism. The denial of standing by the Court in Warth missed the
point of the case completely.

V. Dissenting Voices
A. Douglas and Brennan
As expected, Justice William Brennan, Jr.331 was the leader of
the dissent in Warth. On May 30, 1975, Justice Brennan forwarded a
note to Justice Powell that referred to "No 73-2024
short inter-office 332
Warth v. Seldin."
"Dear Lewis," Justice Brennan's note began, "I shall circulate a
dissent in the above. Sincerely, Bill." Brennan's note was followed
several days later with similar notes from Justice Thurgood Marshall
expressing the fact that they intended to join
and Justice Byron White
333
the Brennan dissent.

The emergence of the dissenting block in Warth was clear by
327. Id. at 4.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 5.
330. Id.
331. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. served on the U.S. Supreme Court for 34 years (19561990). Timeline of the Justices: William J. Brennan, Jr., 1956-1990, http://www.supremecourt
history.org/02_history/subs-timeline/images-associates/076.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
332. Interoffice Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Powell (May 31, 1975) (on
file with author).
333. See Interoffice Memorandum from Justice Marshall to Justice Powell (June 3, 1975)
(on file with author); Interoffice Memorandum from Justice White to Justice Powell (June 3,
1975) (on file with author).
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March 19. March 19 was the day of the conference on Warth where
Brennan voted for "reversal. 33 Powell's notes under Brennan's
name reflect his position on the issue. Powell wrote that Brennan
agreed that there was only one issue - standing. Powell also noted
that Brennan believed "Housing Council has standing because one of
its members (Penfield
Homes)... alleged to have been denied
335
building permit."
"If one party has standing not necessary to look to standing of
other parties,"33 Powell added in the Brennan box.33 7 Brennan's
sentiments, as expressed in Powell's notes, from the March 19
conference were reflected in his dissent to Warth.33 s However,
Brennan's dissent commenced with a scathing critique upon the
opinion drafted by Powell. 339 The implication in the dissent was that
Powell and those voting in the majority crafted a new broader
interpretation of standing in order to prevent the plaintiffs from
pursuing viable claims against the city of Penfield.34 °
Brennan described Powell's opinion as an "opinion" that
"purports to be a 'standing' opinion." 341 Brennan added that the
opinion contained "outmoded notions of pleading and of
justifiability" which were used to prevent any of the plaintiffs from
clearin procedural "hurdles, some constructed here for the first
time. ' ' 3 2 Brennan alleged that Powell and the other Justices had
"tossed out of court every conceivable kind of plaintiff343who could be
injured by the activity claimed to be unconstitutional.,
Brennan also discussed in detail the legal issues at stake but
prefaced those arguments with his overall feelings regarding the
decision of the majority to prevent a valid lawsuit to be heard on the
merits:
I can appreciate the Court's reluctance to adjudicate the
complex and difficult legal questions involved in determining
the constitutionality of practices which assertedly limit
residence in a particular municipality to those who are white
and relatively well off, and I also understand that the merits
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Warth v. Seldin Conference Notes, supra note 164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Warth, 422 U.S. at 519-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 519-21.
Id.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.
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of this case could involve grave sociological and political
ramifications. But courts cannot refuse to hear a case on the
merits merely because they would prefer not to, and it is
quite clear, when the record is viewed with dispassion, that at
least three of the groups of plaintiffs have made allegations,
and supported them with affidavits and documentary
evidence,344sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of
standing.
This passage from Brennan's dissent sums up the complex issues
in the case that Powell and the majority refused to acknowledge. In
fact, Powell's opinion is medicinal in nature when compared to
Brennan's much more probing review of the facts. The Powell
opinion removes the sociological and political issues from the case
entirely and decides the case as if the individuals seeking relief do not
exist.
Brennan's dissent was also more than just his own personal
assessment of the facts and the Powell opinion. Brennan supports his
dissent with facts from the case and legal precedent that existed at the
time of the Warth decision. This was very important; otherwise,
Brennan's dissent would have been dismissed as a personal view with
no support for it in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
As an example, Justice William 0. Douglas drafted a short
345
dissent to the Warth decision that suffers from such problems.
While it was a noble argument that raised important issues; it was not
based upon solid legal precedent regarding Article III standing. The
Douglas dissent began as follows: "With all respect, I think that the
Court reads the complaint and the record with antagonistic eyes.
There are in the background of this case continuing strong tides of
of which involve
opinion touching on very sensitive matters, some
346
race, some class distinctions based on wealth.,
Granted, the dissent by Justice Douglas was accurate in raising
the issue of race and class but Douglas, who was ill at the time from a
massive stroke when the dissent was published,347 does not provide
strong legal arguments for the problems with the case in the manner
that Justice Brennan accomplishes in his dissent. Douglas referred to
standing as a "barrier to access to federal courts" and referred to the
issues at stake in Warth as "festering sores.' 348 Douglas, inter alia,
344. Id.
345. See id. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
346. Id.
347. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 416-18.
348. Warth, 422 U.S. at 519.
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proposed that the Court lower the "technical barriers" to curb the
"ancient need" to correct the problem of residential segregation based
upon race and class. 34 9 Most importantly, however, Douglas
35 °
referenced Justice Brennan's dissent and directs the reader to it.
Brennan's dissent was much better because it not only contained
Douglas' references to the race and class issues but also because
Brennan weaved this argument into his overall presentation. Brennan
elaborated on his initial thematic points regarding the case by
explaining that the interests of the low-income black and Puerto
Rican plaintiffs are "intertwined" with the various organizations
seeking to construct housing in the city. 35 1 Brennan wrote that it is a
"glaring defect" for the Court to view each plaintiff as if they were
"prosecuting" separate lawsuits. 35 2 Brennan explained the problem in
this approach with an example from the facts of the case:
For example, the Court says that the low-income minority
plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to show that but for
the exclusionary practices claimed, they would be able to
reside in Penfield. The Court then intimates that such a causal
relationship could be shown only if 'the initial focus (is) on a
particular project'. . .Later, the Court objects to the ability of
the Housing Council to prosecute the suit on behalf of its
member, Penfield Better Homes Corp., despite the fact that
Better Homes had displayed an interest in a particular
project, because that project was no longer live. Thus, we
must suppose that even if the low-income plaintiffs had
alleged a desire to live in the Better Homes project, that
allegation would be insufficient because
353 it appears that that
particular project might never be built.
In other words, Brennan contended that Powell and the Justices
who joined him the majority missed the point or perhaps, they
understood the issue all too well and were engaging in their version
of judicial activism to advance a specific policy. The by-product of
the more stringent legal standard produced in the Warth decision was
to place the plaintiffs in the very difficult position of having to prove
that they could afford to reside in Penfield, in a particular housing
development proposed to be developed but denied a permit for
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 521 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 521-22.
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construction by the city. It was an impossible standard to meet under
the circumstances.
For Brennan, the fact that the plaintiffs were not connected to a
particular project was less important than the fact that the ordinance
was a "total, purposeful, intransigent exclusion of certain classes of
people from the town." 354 Brennan contended that the "scheme"
perpetuated by city officials was "unconstitutional" and to add insult
to injury, the Court, with its ruling, advised the plaintiffs that "they
will not be allowed to prove what they have alleged. 3 55 Brennan

made the point to examine the claims of various plaintiffs separately
in his dissent to further his point.
With respect to the low-income black and Puerto Rican
plaintiffs, Brennan contended that they more than met the existing
legal standards for standing in federal court. Brennan maintained that
these plaintiffs had alleged harm that they personally had suffered
from as a result of the "exclusionary" practices in housing of the city
of Penfield.356 The harm suffered, according to Brennan, is "more
palpable and concrete than those held sufficient to sustain standing357
in
other cases" such as Sierra Club, S.C.R.A.P., and Data Processing.
Brennan raised the same kinds of personal harm that the
plaintiffs stated emphatically in their affidavits: issues relating to the
quality of life that their children must endure living in a poor, violent,
and unstable section of Rochester where the schools are substandard
and the apartments are in disrepair.358 Brennan furthered the
argument by comparing the facts in Warth to the facts
359 in S.C.R.A.P.,
one of the cases mentioned in the Carr Memoranda.
S.C.R.A.P., 36 according to Brennan, supported the position that
the Court, in Warth, was holding the low-income plaintiffs to an
extremely high standard of proof just on the merits of the allegations.
The Court in S.C.R.A.P. held that the parties had a right to prove their
allegations even though it was alleged that the allegations were, in
fact, "untrue" and a "sham." 361 Brennan noted that the Warth
plaintiffs were being asked to prove the allegations on paper "prior to
discovery and trial., 362 Brennan elaborated on this point, in relevant

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 524.
Id. 526-27.
Id. at 536-28 (citing S.C.R.A.P., 412 U.S. at 689.)
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
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part, as follows:
To require them to allege such facts is to require them to
prove their case on paper in order to get into court at all,
reverting to the form of fact pleading long abjured in the
federal courts.
This Court has not required such
unachievable specificity in standing cases in the past.., and
the fact that it does so now can only be explained by an
indefensible determination by the Court to close the doors of
the federal courts to claims of this kind.36 3
In the end, with respect to the low-income minorities seeking
residence in Penfield, Brennan stressed that the real issue was beyond
the procedural issues supported by the majority in the case. The
Court did not want the matter heard by a court so the plaintiffs were
precluded from being afforded a day in court to prove their very
coherent and serious allegations. Brennan believed it was the very
nature of the allegations that produce legal apprehension by the
Court.
Finally, Brennan briefly discussed the organizational plaintiffs
whom he also contended should have received an opportunity to
demonstrate their allegations. 364 Brennan's discussion of these
allegations was shorter but also similar in tone and substance. The
organizations noted by Brennan are Housing Council and Rochester
Home Builders.
Brennan again repeated the dubious reasons for denying standing
to these organizations: The organizations did not have a current
project they were seeking to build in Penfield- therefore, their
allegations were insufficient to demonstrate injury. 365 Brennan took
the majority to task for invoking this strident standard:
Again, the Court ignores the thrust of the complaints and asks
petitioners to allege the impossible. According to the
allegations, the building concerns' experience in the past with
Penfield officials has shown any plans for low- and
moderate-income housing to be futile for, again according to
the allegations, the respondents are engaged
in a purposeful,
366
conscious scheme to exclude such housing.

363.
364.
365.
366.

Id.
Id. at 523-29.
Id. at 524-25.
Id. at 530.
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Brennan added that the problem was not the refusal of Penfield
to approve or disapprove any particular project. Penfield, according
to the allegations as noted by Brennan, "will not approve any project
which will provide residences for low- and moderate-income
people." 367 Ultimately, Brennan maintained that because the
plaintiffs had made allegations of "past injury" and are further
asserting their "future intent" to build in Penfield if the "barriers
[werel cleared" this was more than "sufficient" to sustain standing in
possessed the
court.3 68 The organizations, according to Brennan,
"requisite personal stake" in the litigation's outcome.36 9
In sum, prior to the Warth decision, the organizational plaintiffs
referenced above satisfied the Court's precedent for standing in
federal court. Likewise, the low- to moderate-income minority
plaintiffs also met the prevailing standards at the time of Warth.
Warth was a departure from the established standard and was a
decision fashioned to conform to certain prevailing attitudes at the
time resistant to residential integration.
B. Post-Warth Dissents
On June 26, 1975, The New York Times reported the Warth
decision. 370 While the Times reported the opinion as a news story,
the opening to the article suggested a little more for the reader: "Slum
dwellers cannot attack suburban zoning restrictions on the ground
that they deliberately make homes too expensive for the poor and
racial minorities to afford."37 '
The suggestion here was that the city was engaged in a deliberate
act of exclusionary zoning but the Court simply refused to allow the
issues in the lawsuit to be resolved in a judicial forum. The article
did not offer any additional passages to elaborate upon this
suggestion; however, the implication was obvious. The Times article
noted that the majority held that the plaintiffs "lacked legal
standing." 372 Justice Brennan's dissent was mentioned numerous
373
times as well. His dissent was described as "sharply worded.
The Washington Post published a three-page commentary to the
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Warren Weaver, Jr., High CourtBars Zoning Challenge, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1975.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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decision a few weeks after the decision. 374 Randall W. Scott, a local
land use attorney, 375 authored the commentary. While Scott's
opinion was concerned to a certain extent with the land use issues,
Scott mentions the substantive issues avoided by the Court.
Scott described the decision as a "missed opportunity if not a
misdirection." 376 In addition, Scott stated that if the decision had
reversed the denial of standing by the lower courts, "this unheralded
case might have become one of the most important decisions
377
affecting local governments since the inception of formal zoning.
Scott does not allow this point to be taken lightly as like Justice
Brennan's dissent, Scott's view was again that the Court's decision to
erected a barrier, a higher standard than usual in a case involving race
and class. While Scott's focus was not specifically race or class, the
implication was fairly obvious.
Scott described the Court's holding as erecting "artificially high
barriers" that denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to "seek redress of
alleged grievances." 378 At the end, Scott also mentioned the issue that
is the crux of the Warth holding: affordable housing.
"The court backed away from dealing with an enormously
the rights of
important and problematic area," Scott wrote, "involving
379
housing."
affordable
seeking
in
citizens
the nation's
In the years immediately following the Warth decision, legal
scholars also addressed the problems brought forth by the opinion.
The focus was again on the new and very difficult standard on
standing in federal court. The writings on the case reveal problems
with the Court's analysis.
New York University Law School Professor Laurence Gene
Sager heavily criticized Warth in a 1978 article analyzing the
principles enunciated by the decision. 380 Sager found the Powell
opinion to be inconsistent with Powell's previous writing in the area
of standing. 3 81 Sager described the opinion as "tortured" and noted
that the "application of this principle to defeat standing ...raises

374. Randall Scott, Supreme Court Seen Missing Thrust of Case, WASH. POST, July 12,
1975, at E-1.
375. The Post article describes Scott as a "research attorney in the field of housing and urban
growth." Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARVARD L. REV. 1373 (1978).
381. Id.
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very serious objections."
Sager wrote that the Court in dismissing the case was demanding
"more specific allegations" from the plaintiffs.
Sager proposed
that such allegations be included in the complaint and offered two
examples. However, both pleading examples provided according to
Sager, were inconsistent with "modem federal practice." 384 Sager
elaborated:

These propositions could easily have been inferred from the
actual complaint in the case, and even under stringent
pleading standards, the case should have been remanded with
instructions to permit amendment of the complaint to include
propositions of this order. To demand what the Warth
majority seemed to require as a condition
for standing is not
385
symptomatic of a sensitive judiciary.
Sager's point was federal courts do not require such
specificity. 386 In addition, Sager pointed out the fact that Powell's
decision would not have granted standing under this scenario as well.
"Justice Powell leaves little, if any, room for an exclusionary zoning
challenge under any other circumstances" 387 according to Sager.
Sager did not accuse Powell of inherent bias or race and class
prejudices but he did allege that Powell and his colleagues in the
majority believed that the judiciary should resist rendering zoning
decisions on municipalities. This view suggests that there was a
personal belief by Powell and the other Justices that the federal
government should not become involved with solving the problems
of local municipalities especially when race and class are so
prevalent. Powell radically interpreted federal standing laws in an
effort to prevent racial integration in a suburban city.
Professor Robert C. Ellickson also ex ressed criticism of the
holding in Warth shortly after the decision.3 V8 While Ellickson only
mentioned Warth in passing in discussing suburban control over land
use by the landowners, Ellickson stressed that efforts by

382. Id. at 1382.
383. Id. at 1383.
384. Id. at 1383-84.
385. Id. at 1384.
386. See Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456 (1942).
387. Sager, supra note 382, at 1384.
388. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
YALE L. J. 385 (January 1977). At the time of the published article below, Ellickson was a
Visiting Professor at Yale Law School. He was a Professor of Law at Stanford Law School.
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municipalities to restrict consumers from residing in their cities is the
policy that creates the problems. Ellickson wrote that such efforts
"may damage a particular subgroup of housing consumers by
enacting a residency restriction that
389 forbids those consumers from
living in a particular part of town."
Finally, the Harvard Law Review's annual review of the
previous Supreme Court term devoted extensive discussion and
critique of the Warth decision worth noting. 39 The Harvard article
noted that the Warth decision and its legal analysis was "inconsistent
with the approach taken in other cases." 9 1 It was also stressed that in
several non-standing cases the Court did not require the stringent
requirements as the Court insisted were necessary in Warth. The
three cases noted by the court are Village93of Euclid v.Ambler Realt4
Co.,392 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas7, and James v. Valtierra.3
All three cases involving housing.
The analysis of the meaning of the cases to the decision was very
important as well:
These decisions suggest that, when a zoning ordinance
deprives an individual of the opportunity to persuade
property owners and builders to accommodate his housing
needs, a constitutionally cognizable case or controversy has
been established. The effect of the Warth holding is to alter
the nature of the injury necessary to create justiciability, from
loss of opportunity to actual denial of access to existing or
planned housing.3
Of these three decisions, Valtierra is most interesting.
Valtierra was a challenge to a constitutional referendum passed
by the voters in California that declared "no low-rent housing project
should be developed, constructed, or acquired in any manner by a
state public body until the project was approved by a majority of
those voting at a community election., 396 Several citizens, eligible
for low-income housing, as a result of the referendum, filed suit
attacking the referendum on constitutional grounds. The citizens
389. Id. at 413.
390. Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning, 89 HARVARD L. REV. 189 (1975).
391. Id. at 190-91.

392. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
393. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
394. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
395. Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 392, at 191.

396. 402 U.S. at 139.
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were successful initially in enjoining enactment of the referendum
but the Court reversed their injunction preventing the enforcement of
the referendum.
Valtierra is not a good decision with respect to fair housing
policy. Actions by municipalities to engage in practices that promote
residential segregation are upheld. However, the citizens were, at
least, afforded an opportunity to pursue legal action against
government entities in a legal forum. In Warth, the opportunity to
present evidence of discrimination on the basis of race, an actual
protected class under the law, was denied.

VI. Final Observations and Conclusions
A. The Nixon Legacy
Due to Justice Powell's decision in Warth, President Richard
Nixon forged his deep-seated goals in housing in the United States
that included the promotion of suburban segregation based upon race
and class. 397 Powell's decision in Warth allowed the Nixon agenda to
move advance in a significant manner. In summary, the goal of
integration inherent in the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was
marginalized.398 African Americans, in general, remain segregated
residentially in the U.S. following the decision and the Warth
decision is part of that legal legacy. 399 While there have been
successful efforts at integration, the Warth decision is a procedural
bar to certain kinds of lawsuits in that might address suburban
segregation patterns. Suburban segregation like that perpetuated by
the city of Penfield is one of the main culprits in the forging of this
legacy.

397. Lamb, supra note 128, at 3-4. See also Hutchinson, supra note 403.
398. The legislative history of the Fair Housing Act indicates that the law should fight
discrimination in housing in the U.S.; however, the law also was passed to promote racial
integration in housing in the U.S. Lamb, supra note 128, at 10-11.
399. A recent report issued by the National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal
Opportunity reports that racial segregation is still a very serious problem in the U.S. The report, in
relevant part, stated the following: "When the Fair Housing Act became law in 1968, high levels
of residential segregation had already become entrenched. However, the Act's promise as a tool
for deterring discrimination and dismantling segregation remains unfulfilled. During the 40 years
since the Act was passed, these segregated housing patterns have been maintained by a
continuation of discriminatory governmental decisions and private actions that the Fair Housing
Act has not stopped." NEW: National Commission on Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, The
Future of Fair Housing 23 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.naionalfairhousing.org/Portals/
33/reports/FutureofFairHousing.pdf.
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B. The Powell Manifesto: The Hidden Clue?
Of the many Supreme Court Justices nominated to serve on the
Court and then confirmed, Justice Lewis Powell fits into the category
of Justices who have done very well in that process. The U.S.
Senate, despite opposition presented by Congressmen John Conyers
of Michigan, overwhelmingly confirmed Powell.4 °°
However, investigative journalist, Jack Anderson, revealed one
year following Powell's confirmation a secret memorandum written
by Powell known as "The Powell Manifesto" that probably would
have inspired great scrutiny of Powell if it had been discovered prior
to his appointment. 4 01 Powell wrote the memorandum to Eugene
Sydnor, Jr., Chairman of the Education Committee of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce on August 23, 1971, two months prior to his
nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court.40 2 It was widely circulated
within the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and argued that corporations
were under attack. Powell's solution was to endorse a counter-attack
by corporations led by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. This was
specifically why Powell sent the memorandum to Syndor.
"No thoughtful person can question that the American economic
system is under broad attack." Powell's letter began. "This varies in
scope, intensity, in the techniques employed, and in the level of
visibility. 4 °3 Powell stressed that the attacks on corporations were
not "sporadic or isolated ... from a relatively few extremists or even

from the minority socialist cadre." Powell described the attack as an
"assault on the enterprise system ... broadly based and consistently
04
pursued.A
The Powell Manifesto is bold; it contains the views of a wealthy,
high-achieving lawyer who believes in the free enterprise system and
every aspect of that system. It is a class statement; Powell was
defending the system that had allowed him to become affluent, and
by design, was defending the by-products of that system including
poverty and disparities in wealth and income.40 5
400. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 240. Only one senator voted against Powell. Senator Fred
Harris of Oklahoma also noted his belief that Powell demonstrated a bias based on economic
class.
401. See Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Corporate Attorney, to Eugene B. Snydor,
Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23, 1971), available at
http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org/corporate-accountability/powell-memolewis.html
(hereinafter "The Powell Manifesto").
402. Id.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
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Powell names "Communists," "New Leftists," and "other
revolutionaries" as the leaders of the movement against corporate
power and insists that the attack can be found coming from "perfectly
respectable elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit,
the media, the intellectual and literary journals, the arts and sciences,
and from politicians. ' 4°6 The nature of the attack was serious as well,
according the Powell, as financial institutions were subject to
violence, students were being taught radical ideologies condemning
capitalism, and corporations, overall, were subject to a barrage of
criticism from a variety of prominent individuals, the most successful
of which is Ralph Nader, a consumer lawyer and highly successful
advocate. ,'4°
Powell's letter to his friend, Eugene Syndor, stated exactly what
needed to be done in order to address the problem with respect to
each of the problem areas named in the memorandum. This
memorandum, according to at least one commentator, was allegedly
the basis for the economic wing of the conservative movement that
emerged during the Nixon era and continued for the most part for
nearly 40 years. 09 Indeed, in 1975 the conservative think tank, the
Heritage Foundation was founded, 4 ° and the modem conservative
movement was unleashed with all of its power and domination of
American fiscal policy.
Powell recommended aggressive action to confront the direct
threat to the corporate free market system.41 Corporations should
create a position within their companies that will be engaged in
seeking to counteract the threat to capitalism. The issue was not just
406. Id.
407. Ralph Nader is a consumer advocate, lawyer, author, and has been named by Time
Magazine as one of the 100 Most Influential Americans in the Twentieth Century. For over four
decades Ralph Nader has exposed problems and organized millions of citizens into more than 100
public interest groups to advocate for solutions. His efforts have helped to create a framework of
laws, regulatory agencies, and federal standards that have improved the quality of life for two
generations of Americans. His groups were instrumental in enacting the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, and the Safe Drinking Water Act. In 2000, 2004, and 2008, Ralph
Nader was a candidate for President of the United States.
About Ralph Nader,
http://www.votenader.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
408. The Powell Manifesto, supra note 403.
409. Id.
410. The Heritage Foundation is the nation's most broadly supported public policy research
institute, with more than 390,000 individual, foundation, and corporate donors. The mission
of the organization is "to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on
the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional
American values, and a strong national defense."
Heritage Foundation Mission Statement,
http://www.heritage.org/press/pahn/mission.cfim (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
411. The Powell Manifesto, supra note 403.
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profit, in Powell's opinion; it was the survival of free enterprise. 412
In addition, Powell recommended the creation of scholars and
speakers "of national reputation," individuals "who do believed in the
system" to provide a counterattack on college campuses to the
perceived threat to the intellectual attacks Powell noted in the
memorandum.41 3 The counterattack upon college campuses also
would entail a review of textbooks used to teach students in order to
understand to what kind of information was being disseminated to the
students. Powell described this
414 aspect of his program as keeping
textbooks "under surveillance.,
Other elements of Powell's program included the use of
television to promote the pro-capitalism message, radio and other
media, equal time on college campuses, scholarly journals, books,
paperbacks, pamphlets, development of graduate schools of business,
advertising, use of the legal system to advance the pro-capitalist
vision, and an overall
more aggressive attitude in preserving the
41 5
system.
corporate
With respect to the entire program, Powell was clear as well as
to how it had to present itself:
Essential ingredients of the entire program must be
responsibility and "quality control." The publications, the
articles, the speeches, the media programs, the advertising,
the briefs filed in courts, and the appearances before
legislative committees - all must meet the most exacting
standards of accuracy and professional excellence. They must
merit respect for their level of public responsibility and
scholarship, whether one agrees with the viewpoints
expressed or not.416
Why is Powell's role in this policy significant?
Powell's stance is important because it was during the time
period following this manifesto that conservative economic ideals
and governmental policies were heavily promoted while, at the same
time, economic inequality began to expand significantly in the U.S.
It was only after the basic tenets of Powell's manifesto appeared
along with implementation of his ideas that inequality expanded
significantly. The statistics during this time period are, indeed,
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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staggering. The U.S. Census Bureau reported the following in 2004:
"The wealthiest 20% of households in 1973 accounted for 44% of
total U.S. income... Their share jumped to 50% in 2002, while
everyone else's fell. For the bottom fifth, the share dropped from
4.2% to 3.5%.417
Even more striking is a 2006 article from The Philadelphia
Inquirer that reported on a survey conducted by Business Week
magazine.41 8 The data reported is again definitive evidence that the
period following the issuance of the Powell memorandum and the
implementation of many aspects of Powell's recommendations,
economic inequality increased substantially. The Inquirer article
reported that in 1980 corporate CEOs were earning 42 times in salary
as the "average American worker."419 By 2000, the CEOs were
earning "531 times" '420 the salary of the workers.
This period, where corporations rose to dominate the path of the
economy and government policy, can be easily linked in time and in
policy to Justice Lewis Powell's dramatic call for conservatives to
defend their economic interests in an aggressive and comprehensive
manner. The Powell Manifesto, inter alia, has proven to be a good
measurement for Justice Powell's core beliefs regarding economic
class.
C. If Powell Had Voted to Reverse
Justice William 0. Douglas suffered a massive stroke on
December 31, 1974, while on vacation in the Bahamas.421 He was
severely incapacitated and was never fully recovered. Douglas did
continue to participate in the Court's affairs following the stroke but
seven of his colleagues on the Court voted to re-hear any case where
he would cast the deciding vote.422 In an indirect way, this
development could have had ramifications for the Warth decision if
Powell's vote had been different.
Consider the following: If Justice Powell voted to reverse in
Warth, Warth was potentially a 5-4 decision to reverse with Douglas
voting with the majority. By March 1975 when oral argument was
417. Gap Between Haves and Have Nots, USA TODAY, Aug. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-08-16-income-disparity-x.htm.
418. Robert H. Frank, The Income Gap Grows, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 27,
2005, availableat: http://www.commondreams.org/views05/1127-25.htm.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. JEFFERIES, supra note 19, at 416-18.
422. Id.
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held, Douglas was effectively muted on the Court with respect to his
vote. His vote, if Powell had voted to reverse, was a deciding vote;
therefore, the case would have to be re-argued under the agreement
forged by the sitting Justices at the time.
President Gerald Ford nominated John Paul Stevens to the Court
when Ford took office following the resignation of Richard Nixon in
August 1974. 423 Stevens was confirmed. Thus, the vote in Warth
would have become to Stevens' vote to decide the case.
Stevens recently has been a solid voting member of the liberal
wing of the Court, though historically not an ideologue. While he
opposes affirmative action programs as a Justice, his views on
segregation are different.424 When he served as a clerk on the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1948, Stevens wrote a memorandum stating that
segregation is unconstitutional. 425 This is a good indication that
Stevens might have, at least, allowed the plaintiffs to present their
case to a court of law whether he believed in the merits of the
allegations or not.
In conclusion, the decision in Warth v. Seldin is a lost moment in
the U.S. legal history. The U.S. Supreme Court was afforded an
opportunity to open up housing opportunities for minorities and lowincome families, or at least, provide a forum where the plaintiffs
could try to prove their case, however the Court, with Justice Lewis
Powell taking the lead, decided to close the judicial system as the
appropriate forum to resolve the issue.
Segregation, in effect, found protection through the U.S.
Supreme Court. Perhaps, the plaintiffs in Warth did not have a strong
case, as Ron Carr, Powell's law clerk, suggested in his writings.
However, even Carr, skeptical of the merits of their case, would have
provided them with an opportunity to be heard. Did Justice Powell, a
man born and bred in the segregated South, and a man of a privileged
economic background, miss an opportunity to address housing
discrimination in the U.S. by allowing his own beliefs to influence
his decision? The evidence suggests that this is precisely what
happened.

423. Id. at 420-21.
424. Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, THE N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, available at
http://select.nytimes.com/preview/2007/09/23/magazine/1 154689944149.html?pagewanted=i.
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